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تنقل  مثلُمميزاتها أكثر شعبية اليوم بسبب  coh da ــالشبكات اللاسلكية وتحديدا شبكات ال صبحتأ 
 ولالمحمتتميز شبكات والخ، و، شخصمع أي و، في أي وقتو الاتصال في أي مكان يستطيعالمستخدم الذي 
ة ونقاط بطوبولوجيا متحركة، وسيط الاتصالات لاسلكي، التعاون الموزع، انعدام البنيات الأساسي coh da
 ونتيجة ،قدةالفيزيائية للعالإصابة الإدارة، موارد محدودة، اتصالات متقطعة، غياب سلطة التصديق وقابلية 
لهوية، السرية، التحقق من ايواجه تحديات في تحقيق الأهداف الأمنية مثل  فإن الأمنلهذه الخصوصيات، 
  .الإنكارالكمال، التوفر، مراقبة الدخول وعدم 
 هنا. ''coh daللشبكات المتنقلة  المتنقل القائم على الوكيل الأمني النموذج''  نقدم الأطروحة، هذه في
مجموعة ال كتلة رئيس انتخاب ، حيث أنمجموعاتإلى  الشبكة تقسيم على رئيس المجموعة القائم مفهوم نطبق
صيغة كذلك و العقدة موارد لتقييم عوامل خمس من دالة تتكون نقترحو ،العقدة وكفاءة موارد الثقة مبني على
  .العقدة لتقدير ثقة رياضية
تمادا ًاع العقدة موارد حيث يدير )tnegA edoN( العقدة وكيل: وكلاء ثلاثة مساهمة، استخدمناأول في 
 ينشئ وهو لكتلة،لممثلاً  يعتبر الذي) tnegA rotinoM( وكيل المراقبة. المقترحة والشروط القدرة على
بينما  ،الفجائي التفتيش بغرض المجموعة عقد كافة إلى رسلهيُ و )tnegA rotcepsnI( التفتيش وكلاء وكيل/
 )tnegA rodassabmA( ، ووكيل السفير)tnegA retropsnarT(وكيل النقل أضفنا في المساهمة الثانية، 
نع التسلل مأو وهو يعتبر مثل نظام كشف  ،كل عقد المجموعةإلى رسل يُ بواسطة وكيل المراقبة و يُنشيءالذي 
 .على مستوى العقدة
 الأهدافاً تقريبيلبي  نموذجنا تنفيذ أن نلخص أن يمكننا عليها، الحصول تم التي النتائج إلىواستناداً 
ث لم نستطع ، حيالأمنليس الحل السحري لمشكلة  اقترحناه وحققناهالحل الذي فإن ومع ذلك   .للأمن الرئيسية
جل ة من أالأبواب للدارسات المستقبلين نكون قد فتحنا أ كل النقاط المتعلقة بالموضوع ولكن نأمل ةغطيت
 .تطوير وتحسين هذا الحل
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.coh da




Wireless Networks, especially ad hoc networks are becoming more and more popular today 
due to its advantages such as user mobility who enables the communication anywhere, anytime, 
with anyone, etc.  
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks are characterize by dynamic nature of network topology, radio 
communication medium, distributed cooperation, lack of a pre-existing infrastructure or 
management point, resource constrained, the sporadic nature of connectivity, an absence of a 
certification authority, and physical vulnerability of node. As a result of these specificities, the 
security of mobile ad hoc network pose both challenges and opportunities in achieving security 
goals, such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, access control, and non-
repudiation. 
In this thesis, we introduce ''Security Model based on Mobile Agent for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks''. We apply the concept of dominating set based clustering for partitioning network into 
clusters. The cluster head elected based on both the trust and resources ability of the node. We 
propose an optimization function of five parameters to evaluate node resources and the formula 
to estimate the trust of the node.  
In the first contribution, we use three agents: Node Agent (NA) manages node resources 
depending on the capacity and the proposed conditions. Monitor Agent (MoA) who considered a 
representative of the cluster, it creates Inspector Agent (IA) and sends it to all nodes of the cluster 
for surprise inspections. While in the second contribution, we added a Transporter Agent (TA), 
an ambassador agent (AmA) that creates by Monitor Agent and sending to all nodes in the 
cluster. The Ambassador Agent is like local IDS and IPS (Intrusion Detection System and 
Intrusion Prevention System) at the node.  
Based on the obtained results, we can summarize that the implementation of our model satisfy 
almost the main objectives of the security. However, the solution we propose and realize is 
certainly not the miracle solution to the security problem in ad hoc networks, we cannot cover all 
the points of our subject but we hope to have succeeded in opening ports to studies in future to 
develop or make improvements to this solution.  
 
 
                                           
Keywords: Multi-Agent System, Mobile Agent, Security, Wireless Network, Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks.
                                                                                                                                                                            Résumé 




Les réseaux sans fil en particulier les réseaux ad hoc sont de plus en plus populaires 
aujourd'hui en raison de ses avantages tels que la mobilité des utilisateurs qui permet la 
communication n'importe où, n'importe quand, avec n'importe qui, etc. 
Les réseaux ad hoc mobiles sont caractérisés par la nature dynamique de la topologie du 
réseau, du support de communication radio, de la coopération distribuée, de l'absence d'une 
infrastructure préexistante ou d'un point de gestion, des ressources limitées, de la connectivité 
sporadique, de l'absence d'autorité de certification et de la vulnérabilité physique du nœud. En 
raison de ces spécificités, la sécurité du réseau ad hoc mobile pose à la fois des défis et des 
opportunités pour atteindre les objectifs de sécurité, tels que la confidentialité, l'authentification, 
l'intégrité, la disponibilité, le contrôle d'accès et la non-répudiation. 
Dans cette thèse, nous présentons le «Modèle de Sécurité basé sur l'Agent Mobile pour les 
Réseaux Mobiles Ad Hoc». Nous appliquons le concept de l'ensemble dominant basé sur le 
regroupement pour le partitionnement réseau en clusters. Le chef du cluster est élu en fonction de 
la confiance et des ressources du nœud. Nous proposons une fonction d'optimisation de cinq 
paramètres pour évaluer les ressources des nœuds et la formule pour estimer la confiance du 
nœud. 
Dans la première contribution, nous utilisons trois agents : Agent Nœud (NA) qui gère les 
ressources des nœuds en fonction de la capacité et des conditions proposées. Agent Monitor 
(MoA) qui a considéré un représentant du cluster, il crée Agent Inspecteur (IA) et l'envoie à tous 
les nœuds du cluster pour les inspections surprise. Dans la deuxième contribution, nous avons 
ajouté un Agent Transporteur (TA), un agent ambassadeur (AmA) qui a créé par l'agent Monitor 
et l’envoyé à tous les nœuds du cluster. L'agent Ambassadeur est considère comme l'IDS et l'IPS 
local (Système de Détection d'Intrusion et Système de Prévention d’Intrusion) au nœud. 
À la base des résultats obtenus, on peut résumer que la mise en œuvre de notre modèle satisfait 
presque les principaux objectifs de la sécurité. Toutefois, la solution que nous proposons et 
réaliser n’est sûrement pas la solution miracle au problème de sécurité dans réseaux ad hoc, nous 
ne pouvons pas couvrir tous les points de notre sujet mais nous espérons avoir réussi à ouvrir des 
ports à des études en futur pour développer ou faire des amélioration à cette solution. 
 
Mots-clés : Système Multi-Agents, Agent Mobile, Sécurité, Réseau sans fil, Réseau Mobile Ad-
hoc.
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This chapter gives an overview over the thesis. It especially constraints the work into a 
specific application domain, and gives the limits and boundaries of the elaborations. The 
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1.1   Overview  
Wireless networks are becoming more and more popular today. This popularity is due to 
its advantages compared to wireline networks, as, user mobility who enables (communication 
anywhere, anytime, with anyone), fast and simple installation, flexibility, scalability and 
relatively low price.  
Wireless networking has been of various sizes, such as Wireless Personal Area Networks 
(WPANs), Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks 
(WMANs), and Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWANs). These wireless networks can be of 
different formations, such as cellular networks, ad hoc networks, mesh networks, and can be 
domain specific networks, such as vehicular communication networks and sensor networks. 
As a result, Wireless networks technologies differ from one type to another in many of the 
characteristics. 
Unfortunately, the security aspects of these technologies were lax to begin with and have 
improved only marginally. They are still rife with security design flaws and weak built-in 
security mechanisms. In fact, security is an essential service for wireless network 
communications. The success of these technologies will depend on people’s confidence in its 
security. However, the specificities of wireless network pose both challenges and 
opportunities in achieving security goals, such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, 
availability, access control, and non-repudiation. 
The mobile agent has received considerable attention in recent years for its wide 
applications in various areas of computing technology. This has led to deal more efficiently 
and elegantly with the dynamic, heterogeneous, and open environment, which is today’s 
wireless network. 
A mobile agent is a software program with mobility that can be sent out from a node into a 
wireless network and roam among the nodes in the wireless network. It can be executed on 
those nodes to finish its task on behalf of its owner. The direction of a mobile agent can be 
multi-way, from any node to another within that network. The migration of a mobile agent 
can occur multiple times before it comes back to its home node with the computation results. 
In addition, not only the application logic of a mobile agent is transferred between nodes, but 
also the application state can be transferred from one node to another. The transferring of a 
mobile agent state facilitates it in working autonomously to travel between one or more 
remote nodes [1]. 
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A lot of research has been dedicated to address the security problems in a mobile agent 
system. This research differs in its aim, emphasis, base, and technique. Some work are 
towards building the foundations for the security of a mobile agent system; some propose 
security mechanisms following different approaches; some focus on introducing security 
mechanisms into the architectures of mobile code systems; and others implement real 
applications with security features. However, there has been limited research dedicated to 
provide an intuitive formal framework for a secure mobile agent system, including formal 
modeling of mobility, communication, and execution [2]. 
1.2   Problem Definition 
As we know, Wireless Networks are becoming more and more popular at the office, home, 
hotel, coffee shops, airports, train stations, and many other places. However, the bad news 
that wireless networks are a major target for attackers. The security concerns in wireless 
networking remains a serious impediment to widespread adoption. The underlying radio 
communication medium for wireless networks is a big vulnerability. As a result, the channel 
can be eavesdropped by placing an antenna at an appropriate location, an attacker can 
overhear the information that the victim transmits or receives. In addition, the data can be 
altered where an attacker can try to modify the content of the message exchanged between 
(wireless) parties.  The channel can be jammed, notably in order to perpetrate a DoS attack by 
transmitting at the same time the victim transmits or receives data, an attacker can make it 
impossible for the victim to communicate. Moreover, the radio channel can be overused 
where the radio spectrum being a shared resource, there is a risk that a wireless operator or a 
user makes an excessive use of it. 
On the other hand, security in wireless ad hoc network is more difficult to achieve due to 
lack of a pre-existing infrastructure or management point, unreliable communication, 
intermittent connection, node mobility, and dynamic topology, the limited physical protection 
of each of the nodes, the sporadic nature of connectivity, and the absence of a certification 
authority. In addition, wireless (mobile) devices usually have limited bandwidth, storage 
space, and processing capacities. It is harder to reinforce security in wireless networks than in 
wired networks. 
Furthermore, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have many unique features that differ from 
wireless ad hoc networks. Firstly, a large-scale sensor network and typical sensor nodes are 
limited in their energy, computation, and communication capabilities. Secondly, wireless 
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sensor nodes may be dispersed over a wide geographical area, presenting the additional risk of 
physical attack. Thirdly, sensor networks interact with people and environments, posing new 
security risks. 
In the light of the above mentioned, wireless ad hoc networks are target for all the threats 
that occur in wireless networks, i.e., masqueraded identities, authorization violations, 
eavesdropping, data loss, modified and falsified data units, repudiation of communication 
processes and sabotage [3]. 
The attacks can be classified according to different criteria, such as the domain of the 
attackers, or the techniques used in attacks. Normally, network security attacks are divided 
into passive and active attacks. The risks associated with wireless networks can be the result 
of one or more of these attacks.  
In particular, attacks in ad hoc networks can cause congestion, propagate incorrect routing 
information, prevent services from working properly, or shut them down completely. Nodes 
that perform active attacks with the aim of damaging other nodes by causing network outage 
are considered malicious, also referred to as compromised, whereas nodes that perform 
passive attacks with the aim of saving battery life for their own communications are 
considered selfish. A selfish node affects the normal operation of the network by not 
participating in the routing protocols or by not forwarding packets as in the so-called black 
hole attack [4]. 
Another classification [5] of attacks (Attacks against secure routing) as, internal attacks 
and external attacks. Internal attacks are more severe attacks, since malicious nodes have 
already been authorized and are thus protected with the security mechanisms the network and 
its services offer. These kind of malicious parties are called compromised nodes. They may 
operate as a group using standard security protection to protect their attacks, compromising 
the security of the whole ad hoc network [3]. 
Internal attacks are especially relevant in ad hoc networks, which are operating in hostile 
environments like enemy battlefields. It is this threat of internal attacks that makes ad hoc 
security an extremely challenging field. Realize that attacks launched from internal attackers 
are much harder to detect for two important reasons. First, if a node determines that the 
routing information that it has received is invalid, it is difficult for it to conclude whether the 
information that it has received became invalid because of changes in the network topology or 
because the sending node was compromised. Second, a compromised node would still 
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arguably be able to generate valid signatures using its private keys, thus making it even harder 
to use cryptography to detect that it has been compromised [6]. 
External attacks on routing can be divided into two categories: passive and active [5]. 
Passive attacks involve unauthorized listening to the routing packets. The attack might be an 
attempt to gain routing information from which the attacker could extrapolate data about the 
positions of each node in relation to the others. In a passive attack, the attacker does not 
disrupt the operation of a routing protocol but only at tempts to discover valuable information 
by listening to the routed traffic. 
Active attacks on the network from outside sources are meant to degrade or prevent 
message flow between the nodes. Active external attacks on the ad hoc routing protocol can 
collectively be described as denial-of-service attacks, causing a degradation or complete halt 
in communication between nodes. One type of attack involves insertion of extraneous packets 
into the network in order to cause congestion. A more subtle method of attack involves 
intercepting a routing packet, modifying its contents, and sending it back into the network. 
Alternatively, the attacker can choose not to modify the packet‘s contents but rather to replay 
it back to the network at different times, introducing outdated routing information to the 
nodes. The goal of this form of attack is to confuse the routing nodes with conflicting 
information, delaying packets or preventing them from reaching their destination. 
The mobile agent has received considerable attention in recent years for its wide 
applications in various areas of computing technology. This has led to deal more efficiently 
and elegantly with the dynamic, heterogeneous, and open environment like the security of ad 
hoc networks. Nevertheless, the mobile agent technology has many security threats because 
the mobile code generated by a party will be transferred and run in an environment controlled 
by the other party. Several security issues arise in various areas to mobile agent computing, 
including authentication, authorization (or access control), intrusion detection, etc. Malicious 
agents, platforms and third parties could attack a mobile agent system. Also, since mobile 
agents have unique characteristics such as mobility of a mobile agent, security issues become 
more complicated in mobile agent systems. 
It is clear that the problem of security is very complicated. Presently techniques are 
available to address some of these problems, such as cryptography, virtual private networks, 
802.1x, Firewalls, etc. Furthermore, the recent advances in encryption, public key exchange, 
digital signatures and the development of related standards have set a foundation for the 
flourishing usage of mobile and wireless technologies in many areas such as e-commerce. 
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However, security in a network goes way beyond encryption of data. It must include the 
security of computer systems and networks, at all levels, top to bottom. It is imperative to 
design network protocols with security considered at all layers as well as to arm the networks 
systems and elements with well designed, comprehensive, and integrated attack defeating 
policies and devices. A foolproof prevention of attacks is challenging because at best the 
defensive system and application software may also contain unknown weaknesses and bugs. 
Thus, early warning systems (i.e. intrusion detection systems) as components of a 
comprehensive security system are required in order to prime the execution of 
countermeasures. 
This is the background of our contribution to implement new concepts to enhance the 
security of the wireless network by improving the security of the mobile agent. A complete 
security solution should include three components of prevention, detection, and reaction. It 
must provide security properties of authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, integrity, 
and availability. It should be adaptive in order to trade-off service performance and security 
performance under resource limitation [7].  
1.3   Limitations of Scope 
There are numerous security attacks that can be mounted on any nodes in a wireless 
networks. Although to treat topic of security in wireless networks, it seem a very large and 
complex issue. However, the scope of this thesis will be specifically aiming to propose a 
Security Model based Mobile Agent for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. 
1.4   Main Contributions 
The essential contribution of this thesis is to propose a Security Model based Mobile Agent 
for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks. This model based on network organization at three levels (node 
level, cluster level, and network level) for hierarchical management of the security services. 
We apply the concept of dominating set based clustering for partitioning network into 
clusters. The cluster head elected based on both the trust and resources ability of the node. 
Therefore, we have proposed an optimization function of five parameters to evaluate node 
resources and the formula to estimate the trust ability of the node. This trust is inspired by 
control all operation of the node (i.e., the reception, the transmission, the behavior, etc.). 
In the first contribution, we define three agent types. The Node Agent (NA) manages the 
use of node resources. The Monitor Agent (MoA) that is responsible for all operations within 
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the cluster and outside with counterparts. The Monitor Agent creates the Inspector Agent 
(IA), which travails from node to another to examine the actions history of each node agent to 
detect any suspect behavior, and returns to MoA with report shows the status of each node in 
the cluster.  
In the second contribution, we proposed four types of agents. Node Agent (NA), Monitor 
Agent (MA), Ambassador Agent (AmA), and Transporter Agent (TA). The Monitor Agent 
creates the Ambassador Agents and sending to all nodes in the cluster. The Ambassador 
Agent is like local IDS and IPS (Intrusion Detection System and Intrusion Prevention System) 
at the node.  
The third contribution is considered a hybrid approach for the two preceding. The Monitor 
Agent created in the most trusted with best resources node to control the communication 
inside and outside the cluster. In this framework, we propose an architecture of the mobile 
agent, which acquires the ability to react with unpredictable behavior and achieve security 
goals.  
Finally, we can summarize the objective of our model satisfy almost the main purposes of 
the security: Authentication, where we used the Monitor Agent after the election process as 
trusted site. Confidentiality, we used the mechanism of cryptography symmetric inside the 
cluster and asymmetric outside the cluster. Availability, the Monitor Agent checks the 
presence of Nodes by it sends a message or by Inspector Agent. Integrity, to realize the 
integrity we use the hash value for verifying the data sent through the nodes of network. In 
our model, we used Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1). Non-repudiation, the repudiation 
cannot appears in our model because Node Agent(s) or/and Ambassador Agent(s) records all 
sends and receives operations. In addition, the Inspector Agent has the ability to detect any 
repudiation through analysis and comparison. 
1.5   Originality of Intended Work 
Resolve the security issues are very important in mobile ad hoc networks, which will 
allows spread rapidly. Various security solutions have been proposed to protect these 
networks from vulnerabilities, which an attacker could take advantage of causing a disruption 
to the normal operation of the network or breaching the confidentiality of a user’s data. 
However, the solutions that have been proposed suffer from drawbacks. For example, there is 
no generalized framework that can be adapted to different types of mobile ad hoc network and 
application, i.e. although these approaches have been able to respond to a set of security 
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requirements, they remain effective only in a specific context related to the assumptions and 
restrictive requirements that were issued during the design. In addition, most of these security 
schemes either provide protection to agents from agents/host or host from agent/external 
parties but not both. Moreover, most of these works are still only at the theoretical level and 
have not been implemented on the reality, and so on. The proposed model attempts to be cost 
effective, prevent various attacks, and try to avoid all the disadvantages of previous 
approaches. 
1.6   Research Methodology 
 Background Research and Literature Review 
Research possible security threats and vulnerabilities associated with mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs). Then investigate current solutions that attempt to address these 
vulnerabilities and find the weaknesses in these solutions. The research will then continue by 
exploring the current types of security available in an attempt to find a more suitable solution. 
 Design Proposed Security Solution 
From the information gathered in the literature review, a solution will be put forward 
which addresses the needs of security services by eliminating the vulnerabilities, which used 
via the attackers and improving the security of previously proposed solutions. 
 Write and Submit Research Papers 
Using the information gathered in the literature review and the model of the proposed 
security solution and it has been published. 
 Create a Security Solution 
Create a security solution within the prototype environment. The agents modelled and the 
behavior the agents in relation to each other and the full model programmed. Security solution 
created using the Aglets accompanied with Java Development Kit (JDK 7) and the NetBeans 
IDE version 8.0.2. All these tools are installed on a computer running windows 7 system and 
equipped by Intel core i7 processor. 
 Test Prototype  
The prototype tested to see if the model operates correctly. After the test that carried out 
with a variety of scenarios, which examined in the literature review. We observe how the 
model reacts of the attacks, where it prevented or mitigated successfully. 
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 Evaluation of Results 
The results of the prototype will be gathered and evaluated to see if any flaws are 
discovered and then possible improvements can be made to the design. 
 Thesis Write-up 
1.7   Structure of Dissertation 
In the second chapter, we presented '' A brief background of wireless networks'', begins by 
answering the question ''What is a Wireless Network?'', next, it presents the categories of 
Wireless Networks, such as, infrastructure-based networks, infrastructureless networks, 
Wireless Local-Area Networks (WLANs), Wireless Personal-Area Networks (WPANs), 
Wireless Metropolitan-Area Networks (WMANs), Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWANs), 
and essential technology in each category. 
The purpose of chapter three is to present rich details of ''Security in Wireless Networks'', 
this part discusses the concept, the security goals, attacks on wireless networks, challenges, 
security aspects, including, Service Set Identifier (SSID), authentication, the WEP Protocol, 
802.1x, IEEE 802.11i, Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), firewalls, etc. We also discuss the 
variety of security mechanisms such as protocols, algorithms and key management. Although 
the covered topic may not be an exhaustive representation of all the security issues in wireless 
networks, we represent a rich and useful sample of the strategy and content. 
The concept of mobile agent, their properties, advantages for using in wireless networks, 
and various aspects of security in the mobile agent discussed in the chapter four. It also 
dedicated in shedding light on the works developed which are used for the security based 
mobile agent in ad hoc networks and finished this part by giving our discussion and some 
critics. 
The five chapter which are devoted to the proposal of our model that called ''Security 
Model based Mobile Agent for Ad Hoc Networks'', that goal is to improve security in mobile 
ad hoc networks. This model based on network organization at three levels (node level, 
cluster level, and network level) for hierarchical management of the security services. We 
propose an optimization function of five parameters to evaluate node resources and the 
formula to estimate the trust ability of the node, a network topology based on the concept of 
clusters with the mobile agent technology. We define several types of agents, in this 
framework, we propose an architecture of the mobile agent, which acquires the ability to react 
Chapter 1                                                                                                                   Introduction 
10 
  
with unpredictable behavior and achieve security goals. We gave class diagrams, and 
communication protocol of our Model. 
The six chapter describes the implementation of our model, where we used a platform for 
developing mobile agents published by IBM called Aglets, accompanied with java 
development kit (JDK 7) and the NetBeans IDE version 8.0.2. All these tools are installed on 
a computer running windows 7 system and equipped by Intel core i7 processor. For testing the 
implementation, we used ad hoc network include four machines, such as every machine is 
configured to run the Aglet Agents. The tests demonstrate a feasibility the model developed to 
increase the level of security in the ad hoc network, without effect it performance.  
Finally, in chapter seven, we are finishing through a conclusion with few prospects that 
come to crown this work, showing the strong points and weakness, and defining the future 
work, we intend to lead and that go in the direction of improving security in ad hoc networks.                             






Chapter 2  







This chapter gives an overview of Wireless Networks. It begins by answering the question 
what is a Wireless Network?. Next, it presents the categories of Wireless Networks, such as, 
Infrastructure-based Networks, Infrastructureless Networks, Wireless Local-Area Networks 
(WLANs), Wireless Personal-Area Networks (WPANs), Wireless Metropolitan-Area Networks 
(WMANs), Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWANs), and essential technology in each 
category. 
 
2.1   What is a Wireless Network? 
A wireless network is, as its name suggests, a network in which at least two devices 
(computer, PDA, printer, router, etc.) can communicate without physical wires [8]. It use 
radio waves rather than cables to broadcast network traffic and transmit data. Wireless 
networks can be operated in two different modes. Ad-hoc mode consists of at least two 
wireless stations where no access point is involved in their communication. In the 
infrastructure mode, communication between nodes are routed through an Access Point (AP), 
which is analogous to the base station in a cellular network. 
We are going to turn, in the distant future, into a 
race of people who possess extraordinary 
communication with one another. 
                                                Francais Ford Coppola 
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 2.2   Classification of Wireless Networks 
A number of different wireless networks exist and can be categorized in various ways 
depending on the criteria chosen for their classification, such as network architecture and 
communication coverage area [9].  
Based on Network Architecture, where wireless networks can be divided into two broad 
categories based on how the network is constructed: Infrastructure-based networks, 
Infrastructureless networks. Based on Communication Coverage Area, where, as with wired 
networks, wireless networks can be categorized into different types of networks based on the 
distances over which the data are transmitted: Wireless Wide-Area Networks (WWANs), 
Wireless Metropolitan-Area Networks (WMANs), Wireless Local-Area Networks (WLANs), 
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Figure 2.1: Presents a Classification of Wireless Networks and Technologies 
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2.2.1   Mobile Cellular Networks  
Wireless Cellular Networks (infrastructure-based network) is a network that has a pre-
constructed infrastructure that is made of a fixed network structure (typically, wired network 
nodes and gateways). Network services are delivered via these pre-constructed infrastructures. 
[9]. A brief overview on each generation is given below. 
 First-Generation Mobile Systems (1G) 
The first-generation mobile system started in the 1980s was based on analogue 
transmission techniques. At that time, there was no worldwide coordination for the 
development of technical standards for the system [11]. As a result, various standard systems 
were developed worldwide: Advanced Mobile Phones Service (AMPS) in the United States, 
Nordic Mobile Telephones (NMT) in Europe, Total Access Communication Systems (TACS) 
in the United Kingdom, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph (NTT) in Japan, and so on [12]. 
 Second-Generation Mobile Systems (2G) 
The term “Second-Generation Mobile Systems” is a generic term referring to a range of 
digital cellular technologies [13]. Compared with first-generation systems, second-generation 
(2G) systems use digital multiple-access technology, such as time-division multiple access 
(TDMA) and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) [9]. 
The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) is by far the most successful 2G 
cellular technology and the first cellular technology to achieve market acceptance on a global 
scale. By 1991, GSM was the first commercially operated digital cellular system with 
Radiolinja in Finland. The GSM system operates at various radio frequencies, with most them 
operating at 900 MHz and/or 1800 MHz. In the US and Canada, the operation is at 850 MHz 
and/or 1900 MHz [14]. GSM uses a combination of time division multiple access (TDMA) 
and frequency division multiple access (FDMA) to divide physical resources among multiple 
users [15]. The original GSM has evolved into a family of standards (3GPP) that includes 
several technologies, which have been designed to be coexisting as complementary systems. 
These are the cases of GPRS, EDGE, WCDMA (FDD and TDD) and TD-SCDMA [16]. 
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) is referred to by many as a 2.5G technology an 
evolution from 2G Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) technology and an 
interim phase toward 3G high-speed services including multimedia traffic with different QoS 
requirements. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) conducted 
GPRS standardization efforts during the mid and late 1990s [17]. It was planned to evolve the 
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existing GSM network, together with the idea of the 3G network, which was conceived of 
circuit-switched services, into a mixed voice and data system that could share some of the 
network elements that were to be deployed for 3G purposes. With this objective, and trying to 
reuse as much as possible the existing infrastructure, it was conceived the General Packet 
Radio System (GPRS) for GSM. The changes introduced affected at different levels and 
network elements, but none of them modified the air interface [16]. 
The limitation of the GPRS network such as the data rates, led to ETSI standardization 
organization defined a new family of data services, built on the existing structure of GPRS. 
This new family of data services was initially named Enhanced Data rates for GSM 
Evolution, and subsequently renamed Enhanced Data for Global evolution (EDGE). 
Nevertheless, the disadvantage with EDGE is that the data rates offered are not necessarily 
available throughout the cell. If EDGE is to be offered with complete coverage, the amount of 
cells will increase dramatically [18]. 
 Third-Generation Mobile Systems (3G) 
In effect, 2G systems are limited in terms of maximum data rate. While this fact is not a 
limiting factor for the voice quality offered, it makes 2G systems practically useless for the 
increased requirements of future mobile applications [19]. The goals of the third-generation 
(3G) wireless networks are to solve problems of 2G and 2.5G systems and offer wireless 
Internet services at a wide scale, extending the scope of 2G wireless networks from simple 
voice telephony to complex data applications including voice over Internet protocol (VoIP), 
video conferencing over IP, Web browsing, and multimedia services [20]. 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS) is the generic name for the third 
generation of GSM cellular radio mobile systems. More precisely, UMTS is the European 
vision of International Mobile Telecommunications 2000 (IMT-2000). It represents the ITU-T 
initiative to conceive, design and implement 3G mobile systems for the year 2000 and 
beyond, promising data rates or bandwidth up to 2 Mbps [21]. The key benefits of UMTS 
include improvements in quality and services, incorporated broadband and sophisticated 
multimedia services, flexibility of future service creation and introduction, and ubiquitous 
service portability. Three G networks become a reality when they meet the UMTS standards 
and offer true ubiquity of an IP packet-switched backbone that can deliver any 
communication service anywhere [22]. 
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 Fourth-Generation Mobile Systems (4G) 
The ever-increasing growth of user demands, the limitations of 3G and the emergence of 
new mobile broadband technologies on the market have prompted researchers and industries 
to a thorough reflection on 4G. [23]. 4G is a loose term for the fourth generation of cellular 
communications, offering speeds that are about 10 times faster than they are on current third-
generation, or 3G, networks. Its higher data speeds could make smartphones much more 
comparable to PCs, giving them better multimedia and gaming capabilities [24]. 
2.2.2   Wireless Local-Area Networks (WLANs) 
A wireless local area network (WLAN) is a data communications system implemented as 
an extension or as an alternative to a wired LAN. Using a variety of technologies including 
narrowband radio, spread spectrum, and infrared, wireless LANs transmit and receive data 
through the air, minimizing the need for wired connections [25].  
WLANs can function in two primary modes of operation “ad-hoc mode” (also referred to 
as “peer-to-peer mode”) and “infrastructure mode.” Each one functions in a slightly different 
way and each has advantages within specific situations. Some networks actually make use of 
both modes and are thus called “hybrid mode” networks [26].  
In “infrastructure mode”, two stations exchanging data can communicate only through an 
access point. An access point (AP) is a device that accepts wireless signals from multiple 
nodes and retransmits them to the rest of the network. Access points may also be known as 
base stations. Access points for use on small office or home networks often include routing 
functions. As such, they may also be called wireless routers or wireless gateways [27]. 
 
Figure 2.2: Illustration of WLAN Configuration: (a) ESS Composed of Infrastructure 
BSS, and (b) IBSS [28] 
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In "ad hoc" mode, wireless devices can communicate with each other directly and do not 
use an access point. This is so called an Independent BSS (IBSS). These independent 
networks usually do not require any administration or pre-configuration [29]. However, an ad 
hoc arrangement would not work well for a WLAN with many users or whose users are 
spread out over a wide area, or where obstacles could stand in the way of signals between 
stations. 
Several Standards exist for WLANs, such as IEEE 802.11, a, b, c, d,...., ac, ad af, and the 
last standard (In January 2016) is 802.11ah to be called Wi-Fi HaLow. 
2.2.3   Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) 
A Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) is a computer network used for wireless 
communication among devices (including telephones and personal digital assistants) close to 
a person. The reach of a WPAN is typically a few meters. WPANs can be used for 
communication among the personal devices themselves (intrapersonal communication), or for 
connecting to a higher-level network or the Internet (an uplink) [30]. 
The main design goal of WPANs is to allow devices that are in close proximity to 
communicate and exchange information with each other, either stationary or moving. WPANs 
can be used to replace cables between computers and their peripherals; to share multimedia 
content amongst devices; to build an infrastructure for sensor networking applications; or to 
establish various location aware services. The operating range for these devices is within a 
Personal Operating Space (POS) of up to 10 meters in all directions, and envelops a stationary 
or a mobile person. The concept of a POS can also be extended to devices that are not 
attached to a person, like peripherals such as printers, scanners, digital cameras, etc. [31].  
Several technologies exist for  WPANs, such as Bluetooth, ZigBee, Z-Wave, RFID, 
Infrared Data Association (IrDA), and Ultra-Wideband (UWB), to mention a few. Each of 
these technologies has its own particular strengths and weaknesses in the way it addresses the 
challenge of delivering easy to use. 
2.2.4   Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (WMANs) 
Wireless metropolitan area networks (WMANs) enable users to establish wireless 
connections between multiple locations within a metropolitan area (for example, between 
multiple office buildings in a city or on a university campus), without the high cost of laying 
fiber or copper cabling and leasing lines. In addition, WMANs can serve as backups for wired 
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networks, should the primary leased lines for wired networks become unavailable. WMANs 
use either radio waves or infrared light to transmit data. Broadband wireless access networks, 
which provide users with high-speed access to the Internet, are in increasing demand [32]. 
WMAN technologies must satisfy a wide range of service requirements such as broadband 
access capability, reliability, scalability, security, quality of services, manageability, and cost 
effectiveness, all at a time when multimedia traffic is exploding at exponential rates [21].  
Finally, one main disadvantage of a WMAN presents a very large area for a hacker to 
attempt a break in. Like any wireless access network, a wireless access point is a tempting 
target for someone to hack into a secure network. A WMAN is simply a larger WAN 
footprint, and thus presents a larger opportunity for a hacker [32].  
2.2.5   Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWANs)  
A Wireless Wide Area Network (WWAN) is a class of WAN technologies that uses mostly 
cellular and satellite infrastructures to enable interconnectivity over a WAN via several 
services [33], such as LTE, WiMAX (often called a WMAN), UMTS, CDMA2000, GSM, 
Cellular Digital Packet Data (CDPD) and Mobitex to transfer data. It can also use Local 
Multipoint Distribution Service (LMDS) or Wi-Fi to provide Internet access. These 
technologies are offered regionally, nationwide, or even globally and are provided by a 
wireless service provider. WWAN connectivity allows a user with a laptop and a WWAN 
card to surf the web, check email, or connect to a virtual private network (VPN) from 
anywhere within the regional boundaries of cellular service. Various computers can have 
integrated WWAN capabilities [34]. 
Figure 2.3: Components of a Wireless WAN [35] 
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Wireless connectivity can be installed based on one of two models: where the receiver is 
fixed in position, or where the receiver is mobile. Within these models, there are different 
solutions and options that can be applied. 
The two key solutions are the use of satellite and mobile phone technology. Satellite 
technology is portable, though it requires an element of configuration at each site to point the 
dish at the satellite. Satellite wireless links often work downstream only, from the satellite to 
the receiver, rather than downstream and upstream. In some cases, the upstream connection is 
achieved with a normal telephone line or mobile phone connection [36]. 
Mobile computing devices are getting smaller, cheaper and more powerful. At the same 
time, the amount of information available today is growing astronomically. The demand for 
connecting mobile devices to content rich networks is also rising quickly, and it would seem 
that WWAN technology is the perfect answer. However, today's wireless WANs have 
limitations in several areas, including: security, performance, application persistence, 
roaming, central management, etc. [35]. 
2.2.6   Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs)  
A wireless mesh network (WMN) [37] is a particular type of mobile ad hoc network 
(MANET), which aims to provide ubiquitous high bandwidth access for a large number of 
users. WMN has the ability of self-organization, self-discovering, self-healing, and self-
configuration. A WMN is a consisting of two parts: mesh backbone and mesh clients as 










Figure 2.4: A typical Architecture of a WMN 
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The primary advantages of a WMN lie in its inherent fault tolerance against network 
failures, simplicity of setting up a network, and the broadband capability. Unlike cellular 
networks where the failure of a single Base Station (BS) leading to unavailability of 
communication services over a large geographical area, WMNs provide high fault tolerance 
even when a number of nodes fail [38]. 
2.2.7   Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs)  
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of wireless mobile nodes (or routers) 
dynamically forming a temporary network without the use of any existing network 
infrastructure or centralized administration [39]. In this environment, nodes are free to move 
randomly and organize themselves arbitrarily; thus, the network’s wireless topology may 
change rapidly and unpredictably [40]. Nodes in ad hoc networks are computing and 











Figure 2.5: Illustration of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks 
Nodes in a MANET do not have a priori knowledge of the network topology. They have to 
discover it. A node will find its local topology by broadcasting its presence, and listening to 
broadcast announcements from its neighbors. As time goes on, each node gets to know about 
all other nodes and finds one or more ways to reach them. End-to-end communication in a 
MANET does not rely on any underlying static network infrastructure but requires routing via 
several intermediate nodes [40]. 
Communication Range  
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Recently, MANETs have attracted considerable attentions due to the new developments in 
wireless technology and standards. There are numerous possibilities for applications of the ad 
hoc concept in the networking world. Variety of services and applications were developed 
ranging from tactical military networks, through different commercial and educational 
applications, sensor networks, to location-aware services. Fast deployment and easy 
establishment of functionalities, autonomous or relayed communications, cooperativeness and 
emerging areas of nomadic and ubiquitous computing, as well as improved IP-based 
networking in dynamic autonomous wireless environments promote ad hoc networks as a 
desirable wireless access technology. Ad hoc networking also gets momentum in emergency 
communication in catastrophic disaster areas and during terrorist attacks. They participate in 
collaborative and distributed computing and mesh (infrastructure relayed) and hybrid 
(integrated cellular and ad hoc) wireless networks [41]. 
2.2.8   Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) 
Recent advances in miniaturization, low-cost and low-power circuit design, and wireless 
communications have led to the development of low-cost, low power, and tiny 
communication devices, called sensors. Like nodes (or computers, laptops, etc.) in traditional 
wireless networks, such as mobile ad hoc networks, the sensors have data storage, processing, 
and communication capabilities. Unlike those nodes, the sensors have an extra functionality 
related to their sensing capability [42]. 
Generally, a sensor node refers to any device that is capable to sense its environment. 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) as a technology is a collection of sensor devices that co-
operate with each other. A WSN may comprise even thousands of autonomic and self-
organizing nodes that combine environmental sensing, data processing, and wireless multi-
hop ad-hoc networking [43]. 
The main goal of a WSN is to collect data from the environment and send it to a reporting 
site where the data can be observed and analyzed. Wireless sensor devices also respond to 
queries sent from a “control site” to perform specific instructions or provide sensing samples. 
Finally, wireless sensor devices can be equipped with actuators to “act” upon certain 
conditions. These networks are sometimes more specifically referred as Wireless Sensor and 
Actuator Networks [44]. 
Compared to traditional wireless networks, such as mobile ad hoc wireless networks, 
WSNs have several inherent characteristics. First, the sensors are very tiny and hence more 
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susceptible to hardware failure. It is worth mentioning that battery power (or energy) is the 
most crucial resource, and hence sensors can also fail due to low energy. Second, the sensors 
are deployed in a field with high density to extend the network lifetime. Indeed, using a large 
number of sensors facilitates multi-hop communication between them, and hence the sensors 
can save their energy by transmitting or forwarding their sensed data through short distances. 
Third, the network topology may change very frequently as sensors join and/or leave the 
network. Thus, protocols designed for WSNs should account for all these features, which are 
inherent to these types of networks so they remain operational as longer as possible [42]. 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are used in a variety of applications, such as 
environment monitoring, health care, natural disaster prediction and relief, precision 
agriculture, security,  manufacturing, home appliances and entertainment, transportation, food 
safety, military operations, water quality monitoring, intelligent transportation, smart grid 
communications, and so forth [45, 46, 47].     
2.3   Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have given a simple overview on the concept of wireless networks. In 
fact, the field of wireless networks is very broad and difficult to present to all the details. We 
tried to give a brief overview of the types of wireless networks, such as, Infrastructure-based 
networks, Infrastructureless networks, Wireless local-area networks (WLANs), Wireless 
personal-area networks (WPANs), Wireless metropolitan-area networks (WMANs), Wireless 
wide area networks (WWANs), and essential technology in each category.                               . 







Security in Wireless Networks 
 
                                                                                                          To say a system is secure because no  
                                                                                                                  one is attacking it is very dangerous 
 




In this chapter, the security of wireless networks is addressed. First, answering the 
question “What Is Security?”, next, we present security goals; attacks on wireless networks, 
the main security characteristics, various issues and challenges in various wireless networks, 
especially ad hoc networks. We also discussed the variety of security mechanisms such as 
protocols, algorithms and key management. Although the covered topic may not be an 
exhaustive representation of all the security issues in wireless networks, we do represent a 
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3.1   Introduction 
As we have seen previously, Wireless networks are becoming more and more popular at 
the office, home, a hotel, coffee shops, airports, train stations, and many other places. 
However, the bad news that wireless networks are a major target for attackers. One of the 
biggest challenges today is to make sure that the appropriate tools and mechanisms are used to 
protect data in-transit across wireless networks. In addition, the wireless infrastructure needs 
to be protected against attacks targeted to the wireless networking devices [48]. 
Wireless networks face more security challenges than their wired counterparts. This is 
partly due to the nature of the wireless medium as transmitted signals can travel through the 
walls, ceilings, and windows of buildings up to thousands of feet outside of the building 
walls. Moreover, since the wireless medium is airwaves, a shared medium allows anyone 
within certain distance or proximity to intrude into the network and sniff the traffic. Further, 
the risks of using a shared medium is increasing with the advent of available hacking tools 
that can be found freely from hacker’s Web sites [49]. 
On the other hand, wireless (mobile) devices usually have limited bandwidth, storage 
space, and processing capacities. It is harder to reinforce security in wireless networks than in 
wired networks. Compared with infrastructure-based wireless networks, security management 
for wireless ad hoc networks is more challenging due to unreliable communication, 
intermittent connection, node mobility, and dynamic topology. A complete security solution 
should include three components of prevention, detection, and reaction. It provides security 
properties of authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, integrity, and availability. It 
should be adaptive in order to trade-off service performance and security performance under 
resource limitation [40]. Wireless networks use several techniques to provide secure transfer 
of voice, data, or video (As we will see later).  
3.2   Terminology 
Within the security community, some words have specific meanings. Common security 
vocabulary [50] includes the following: 
 Vulnerability: A defect or weakness in the feasibility, design, implementation, 
operation, or maintenance of a system. 
 Threat: An adversary who is capable and motivated to exploit a vulnerability. 
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 Attack: The use or exploitation of a vulnerability. This term is neither malicious nor 
benevolent. A bad person may attack a system, and a good person may attack a 
problem. 
 Exploit: The instantiation of a vulnerability; something that can be used for an attack. 
A single vulnerability may lead to multiple exploits, but not every vulnerability may 
have an exploit (e.g., theoretical vulnerabilities). 
 Target: The person, company, or system that is directly vulnerable and impacted by 
the exploit. Some exploits have multiple impacts, with both primary (main) targets and 
secondary (incidental) targets. 
 Defender: The person or process that mitigates or prevents an attack. 
 Compromise: The successful exploitation of a target by an attacker. 
 Risk: A qualitative assessment describing the likelihood of an attacker/threat using an 
exploit to successfully bypass a defender, attack a vulnerability, and compromise a 
system. 
 Hacker: The term hacker is closely associated with computer security. In contrast to 
the common terminology, hacker has conflicting definitions. This term originally 
referred to people with highly technical skills. Later it became associated with 
technical malcontents and online anarchists. Today, people with virtually no technical 
skills are called hackers if they use a computer. 
3.3   What Is Security? 
Evidently, the notion of security has many facets, which might depend on the point of view 
of a specific investigation, the levels of abstraction under consideration, or even social 
agreements or personal opinions. In any case, it appears demanding to treat security in 
computing systems as a comprehensive property that takes care of many aspects with mutual 
impacts. It is necessary to find a definition of security common to an asset, a service, an 
infrastructure and an infosphere for any concerned owner. We can find several definitions of 
security. 
According to [51] security is, freedom from danger, safety; freedom from fear or anxiety. 
Another definition in [52] Security is the sum of all measures taken to prevent loss of any 
kind. Loss can occur because of user error, defects in code, malicious acts, hardware failure, 
and acts of nature. With holistic computer security, a number of methods are used to prevent 
these events, but it is primarily focused on preventing user error and malicious acts. 
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Network security is defined as the protection of networks and their services from 
unauthorized access, modification, destruction, or disclosure. It provides assurance that the 
network performs its critical functions correctly and that there are no harmful side effects 
[53]. 
The security of wireless systems can be divided into four sections [54]: 
 Security of the application: This means the security of user applications and standard 
applications such as e-mail. 
 Security of the devices: How to protect the physical device in case it is lost or stolen. 
 Security of the wireless communication: How to protect messages in transit. 
 Security of the server that connects to the Internet or other wired network: After this 
server, the information goes to a network with the usual security problems of a wired 
network (not discussed here). 
Security consists in assessing threats, vulnerabilities and attacks. It also involves 
estimating the cost of the threats and the probabilities of the attacks given the vulnerabilities. 
Once these points assessed, security encompasses developing appropriate safeguards and 
countermeasures, and implementing the ones for which the certain price of the defense is 
worth spending compared to the uncertain loss that a potential threat implies. To achieve this, 
security properties or requirements should be deﬁned [55]. 
3.4   Security Goals  
Five major security goals known as security services and can be used as security 
requirements. These goals are discussed as follows [5, 40, 56, 57, 58]. 
 Authentication: Authentication is the process to verify the identity of the sender of a 
communication. Without authentication, malicious attackers can access resource, gain-
sensitive information, and interfere with the operation of other nodes very easily. In a 
wireless network, this procedure is commonly done both at the network layer and by 
higher layer protocols that the application uses. We can perform authentication with 
either a public key or a secret key. The simplest form of authentication is the 
transmission of a shared password between the entities wishing to authenticate with 
each other.    
 Confidentiality: Confidentiality means certain information is only accessible to 
authorized recipients. Encryption is used to fulfill this goal. With an active attack, it is 
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possible to decrypt any form of encrypted data; thus, confidentiality is primarily 
considered a protection against passive attacks. In the physical world, ensuring 
confidentiality can be accomplished by simply securing the physical area. However, as 
evidenced by bank robberies and military invasions, threats exist to the security of the 
physical realm that can compromise security and confidentiality. The moment 
electronic means of communication were introduced, many new possible avenues of 
disclosing the information within these communications were created.  
 Integrity: Prevents unauthorized changes to the data. Only authorized parties are able 
to modify the data. Modification includes changing status, deleting, creating, and 
delaying or replaying of the transmitted messages. Without integrity, attackers can 
easily corrupt and modify the data and therefore cause mobile devices to make wrong 
decisions based on the corrupted data. 
 Availability: As defined in an information security context, ensures that access data or 
computing resources needed by appropriate personnel is both reliable and available in 
a timely manner. Redundancy, fault tolerance, reliability, failover, backups, recovery, 
resilience, and load balancing are the network design concepts used to assure 
availability. If systems aren’t available, then integrity and confidentiality won’t matter.  
 Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation means that the sender of a message cannot later 
deny sending the information and the receiver cannot deny the reception. This can be 
useful while detecting and isolating compromised nodes.  Any node that receives an 
erroneous message can accuse the sender with proof and, thus, convince other nodes 
about the compromised node. 
3.5   Attacks on Wireless Networks   
While listening on the wireless radio link is the obvious attack, other attacks also exist. 
These attacks can be classified according to different criteria, such as the domain of the 
attackers, or the techniques used in attacks. This section summarizes some of these attacks. 
The list of attacks provided here is by no means a comprehensive list of possible attacks but 
provides a broad view of the attacks that need to be addressed which will motivate the 
subsequent chapters discussing approaches to defending against such attacks. Normally, 
network security attacks are divided into passive and active attacks. Another classification [5] 
of attacks (Attacks against secure routing) as, internal attacks and external attacks.  
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Internal attacks are especially relevant in ad hoc networks, which are operating in hostile 
environments like enemy battlefields. These attacks are more severe attacks, because of two 
important reasons. First, if a node determines that the routing information that it has received 
is invalid, it is difficult for it to conclude whether the information that it has received became 
invalid because of changes in the network topology or because the sending node was 
compromised. Second, a compromised node would still arguably be able to generate valid 
signatures using its private keys, thus making it even harder to use cryptography to detect that 
it has been compromised [59].  
External attacks on routing can be divided into two categories: passive and active [5]. 
Passive attacks involve unauthorized “listening” to the routing packets. The attack might be 
an attempt to gain routing information from which the attacker could extrapolate data about 
the positions of each node in relation to the others.  
Active attacks on the network from outside sources are meant to degrade or prevent 
message flow between the nodes. Active external attacks on the ad hoc routing protocol can 
collectively be described as denial-of-service attacks, causing a degradation or complete halt 
in communication between nodes. One type of attack involves insertion of extraneous packets 
into the network in order to cause congestion. A more subtle method of attack involves 
intercepting a routing packet, modifying its contents, and sending it back into the network. 
Alternatively, the attacker can choose not to modify the packet’s contents but rather to replay 
it back to the network at different times, introducing outdated routing information to the 
nodes.  
3.5.1   Passive Attacks 
An attack is called passive when an unauthorized person obtains access to a resource 
without changing its content [60]. In a passive attack, an unauthorized node monitors and 
aims to ﬁnd out information about the network. The attackers do not otherwise need to 
communicate with the network. Hence, they do not disrupt communications or cause any 
direct damage to the network [61]. The goal of the opponent is to obtain information that is 
being transmitted [62]. Examples of passive attacks are eavesdropping and trafﬁc analysis.   
 Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping also known as, disclosure is a very easy passive attack in the radio 
environment [63]. This attack consist of the unauthorized interception of network 
communication and the disclosure of the exchanged information. This can be performed in 
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several different layers, for example, in the network layer by sniffing into the exchanged 
packets or in the physical layer by physically wiretapping the access medium (cabling or 
wireless medium) [64]. 
In this attack, the intruder listens to things he or she is not supposed to listen it. This 
information could contain, for example, the session key used for encrypting data during the 
session. This kind of attack means that the intruder can get information that is at times strictly 
confidential [58]. 
 Traffic Analysis 
This is a subtle form of passive attack. The objective of an adversary launching this attack 
is to extract information about the characteristics of transmission.  This could include 
information about the amount of data transmitted, identity of communicating nodes, or their 
locations [63]. It is possible that at times for the intruder knowing the location and identity of 
the communicating device or user is enough. An intruder might only require information like 
a message has been sent, who is sending the message to whom, and at the frequency or size of 
the message [58].   
3.5.2   Active Attacks 
An attack is called active when making unauthorized changes are made to messages and 
data flows or files [60]. It is quite difficult to prevent active attacks absolutely, because to do 
so would require physical protection of all communications facilities and paths at all times 
[62]. Active attacks may take the form of one of the four following types, either singly or as a 
combination: 
 Masquerade 
An intruder pretends to be a trusted user and thereby gains certain unauthorized privileges. 
Such an attack is possible if the intruder captures information about the user like the 
authentication data, simply the username and the password. Masquerading includes the use of 
spoofing, rogue APs, and redirection attacks [47]. 
 Replay 
A replay attack occurs when the attacker is able to capture traffic from one party and 
replay it to another, causing the targeted party to perform actions as if the traffic had been 
received from a legitimate sender. Replay attacks are often coupled with other attacks, such as 
man-in-the-middle attacks or denial-of-service attacks [65]. 
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 Message Modification 
The attacker alters a legitimate message by deleting, adding, modifying or rearranging the 
contents [60].  
 Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
The attacker prevents or prohibits normal usage of the management of the communication 
medium [60]. The denial-of-service attack is one of the simplest attacks to implement in 
wireless networks, an attacker attempts through some means to reduce the ability of a network 
or server to provide service to legitimate users. For example, an entity may suppress all 
messages directed to a particular destination (e.g., the security audit service). Another form of 
service denial is the disruption of an entire network, either by disabling the network or by 
overloading it with messages to degrade performance [62]. Sabotage is also a form of DoS 
attack. A DoS attack termed as sabotage could also mean the destruction of the system itself 
[58]. DoS attacks are possible at various layers, namely, physical layer, MAC layer, and 
network layer, and on the applications executing in such networks. For example, jamming of 
radio frequencies could be done at the physical layer similarly; violation of medium access 
control rules could lead to denial of service at the link layer [63].  
 Man-in-the-Middle Threat 
Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks occur when the attacker manages to position themselves 
between the legitimate parties to a conversation. The attacker spoofs the opposite legitimate 
party so that all parties believe they are actually talking to the expected other, legitimate 
parties. A MitM attack allows the attacker to eavesdrop on the conversation between the 
parties, or to actively intervene in the conversation to achieve some illegitimate end [65]. 
3.5.3   Software-Based Attacks 
Malicious software, malicious code, or malware, is software that enters a computer system 
without the owner’s knowledge or consent. Malicious mobile code deals with viruses, worms, 
Trojan horses, and similar problems of rogue code that might compromise security policy. 
Malware is a general term that refers to a wide variety of damaging or annoying software. 
One way to classify malware is by primary objective. The three primary objectives of 
malware are to infect a computer system, conceal the malware’s malicious actions, or bring 
profit from the actions that it performs [57, 66].  
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3.5.4   Attacks in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks 
Wireless ad hoc networks are target for all the threats that occur in networks, the existence 
of the wireless transmission links and dynamic network topology contributes considerably 
towards increasing the threat potential [41]. Attacks in ad hoc networks can cause congestion, 
propagate incorrect routing information, prevent services from working properly, or shut them 
down completely. Nodes that perform active attacks with the aim of damaging other nodes by 
causing network outage are considered to be malicious, also referred to as compromised, 
whereas nodes that perform passive attacks with the aim of saving battery life for their own 
communications are considered to be selfish [4]. This section summarizes some of these 
attacks. The list of attacks provided here is by no means a comprehensive list of possible 
attacks but provides a broad view of the attacks that need to be addressed which will motivate 
the subsequent chapters discussing approaches to defending against such attacks. [5, 19, 40, 
41, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70]. 
 Impersonation  
We talked to this attack under name Masquerade, impersonation attacks are launched by 
using other node’s identity, such as MAC or IP address. Impersonation attacks sometimes are 
the first step for most attacks, and are used to launch further, more attacks that are 
sophisticated. Spoofing occurs when a malicious node misrepresents its identity by altering its 
MAC or IP address in order to alter the vision of the network topology that a benign node can 
gather. Impersonation attacks constitute a serious security risk at all levels of ad hoc 
networking. If proper authentication of parties is not supported, compromised nodes may be 
able to join the network undetectably, send false routing in formation, and masquerade as 
some other trusted node. 
 Location Disclosure 
A location disclosure attack can reveal something about the locations of nodes or the 
structure of the network. The information gained might reveal which other nodes are adjacent 
to the target or the physical location of a node. 
 Trust Attacks 
Trust is a privilege associated between the identities of the user with particular trust level. 
Therefore, a trust hierarchy is an explicit representation of trust levels that reflects 
organizational privileges. It associates a number with each privilege level, which reflects the 
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security, importance, or capabilities of the mobile node and of the paths. Inside or outside 
nodes can initiate attacks on the trust hierarchy, if they try to impersonate anyone else and 
obtain higher-level privileges. 
 Black Hole Attack 
Black hole attacks cause packets to disappear from the network without any trace. In this 
attack, a malicious node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest 
path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept. The attacker will then receive the traffic 
destined for other nodes and can then choose to drop the packets to perform a denial-of-
service attack, or alternatively use its place on the route as the first step in a man-in-the-
middle attack by redirecting the packets to nodes pretending to be the destination. 
Black hole attacks have other variants. In one variant, the data traffic is forwarded to a 
non-existent or another malicious node, where the data are dropped. This forwarding behavior 
before the actual sinking will make the detection of sinking behavior hard. Other than sinking, 
there are numerous ways by which a malicious node can coerce benign nodes to drop 
incoming traffic. Essentially, the malicious node achieves this by disrupting the benign route 
between source and destination. Route disruption can be enforced using spoofing and 
modification of routing messages. 
 Wormhole 
Wormhole attack: a malicious node can eavesdrop or receive data packets at a point and 
transfer them to another malicious node, which is at another part of the network, through an 
out-of-band channel. The second malicious node then replays the packets. This makes all the 
nodes that can hear the transmissions by the second malicious node believe that the node that 
sent the packets to the first malicious node is their single-hop neighbor and they are receiving 
the packets directly from it.  
 Sleep Deprivation 
Sleep deprivation (sometimes called Flooding Attack): Usually, this attack is practical only 
in ad hoc networks where battery life is a critical parameter. Battery powered devices try to 
conserve energy by transmitting only when absolutely necessary. An attacker can attempt to 
consume batteries by requesting routes or by forwarding unnecessary packets to the node 
using, for example, a black hole attack.  
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 Rushing Attacks 
Rushing attacks: to target certain routing protocols that choose routes on what message 
arrives first a rushed malicious route message may block legitimate messages that arrive later. 
In fact, even the secure routing protocols were shown to be vulnerable to this particular 
rushing attack. In case of a typical on-demand ad hoc routing protocol, a node that intends to 
discover a route to a given destination floods the target network with RREQ packets. In order 
to keep the impact of the flood as minimal as possible, the nodes in conventional routing 
protocols forward only the request that arrives first from each Route Discovery. This 
particular mode of route discovery operation is exploited by the rushing attack.  
 Routing Table Overflow 
In this attack, the attacker attempts to create routes to nonexistent nodes. The goal is to 
create enough routes to prevent new routes from being created or to overwhelm the protocol 
implementation. An attacker can disrupt a proactive network simply by sending excessive 
route advertisements to the routers in the network. Reactive protocols, on the other hand, do 
not collect routing data in advance. 
 Cache Poisoning 
Corrupting the routing information (tables) stored locally in the nodes is referred to as 
cache poisoning. In route cache poisoning attacks, attackers take advantage of the 
promiscuous mode of routing table updating, where a node overhearing any packet may add 
the routing information contained in that packet header to its own route cache, even if that 
node is not on the path. 
 Byzantine Attack 
Byzantine attack: A compromised intermediate node works alone, or a set of compromised 
intermediate nodes works in collusion and carry out attacks such as creating routing loops, 
forwarding packets through no optimal paths, or selectively dropping packets, which results in 
disruption or degradation of the routing services. 
 Session Hijacking Attack 
The attacker in a session hijacking scenario exploits the unprotected session following its 
initial setup. The attacker forges the IP address of the victim node, computes the sequence 
number expected by the target, and then launches a DoS attack against the victim. By so 
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doing, the attacker pretends to impersonate the victim node and maintains communicating 
with the target over the already established TCP session. 
 Network Partitioning 
A malicious node can delete routes to isolate a part of the network and render the nodes in 
the isolated network sector unreachable. The above is referred to as network partitioning. 
Statistically, detection of network partitioning is trivial. However, the malicious node can 
thwart detection by exhibiting low layer attacks such as channel jamming, MAC flooding. 
 Link Withholding Attacks 
In this attack, a malicious node does not advertise the information about the links to 
specific nodes or group of nodes, which may result in losing the links to these nodes. 
Mounting such attacks is difficult in the dynamic environment of MANET but is more 
relevant in case of sensor networks. 
 Repudiation Attacks 
In the network layer, firewalls can be installed to keep packets in or keep packets out. In 
the transport layer, entire connections can be encrypted, end-to-end. However, these solutions 
do not solve the authentication or nonrepudiation problems in general. Repudiation refers to a 
denial of participation in all or part of the communication. 
 Jamming 
Jamming is a well-known attack on wireless communication, it interferes with the radio 
frequencies that are used by nodes in a network, and which causes the message to be 
corrupted or lost. A small number of randomly distributed jamming nodes can disrupt the 
entire network, and cause all the nodes in the network to be out of service. There are many 
low cost devices available in the market, which can be used for jamming purpose [71]. The 
most common types of this form of signal jamming are random noise and pulse. 
 Cryptanalysis  
Different ciphers and cryptographic mechanisms are vulnerable to different 
Cryptanalysis attacks that exploit mathematical findings and shortcuts that break or decrease 
the security of a cipher. Cryptanalysis can either support brute-force attacks by reducing the 
size of the probable key-space or make key-search unnecessary by providing alternative ways 
of deciphering the ciphertext. A special kind of Cryptanalysis attack is the side channel attack, 
exploiting weaknesses in the physical implementation of the cipher. 
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 Link Spoofing Attack 
In a link spoofing attack, a malicious node advertises fake links with non-neighbors to 
disrupt the routing operations. For example, in the OLSR protocol, an attacker can advertise a 
fake link with a target’s two-hop neighbors. This causes the target node to select the malicious 
node to be its multipoint relay. As a multipoint relay node, a malicious node can then 
manipulate the data or routing traffic, for example, modifying or dropping the routing traffic 
or performing other types of DoS attacks. 
3.5.4.1   Attacks on VANET 
VANET being a special case of MANET, all the vulnerabilities of MANET may be 
considered here also. We will discuss some specific attacks on VANETs in this section [72, 
73, 74, 75, 76] 
 Sybil Attacks 
Sybil attack is the creation of multiple fake nodes broadcasting false information. In Sybil 
attack, a vehicle install with On Board Unit (OBU) sends multiple copies of messages to other 
vehicle and each message contains a different fabricated identity. The problem arises when 
malicious vehicle is able to pretend as multiple vehicle and reinforce false data, to tell other 
vehicles that there is jam ahead, and force them to take alternate route. Sybil attack depends 
on how cheaply identities can be generated, the degree to which the system accepts inputs 
from entities that do not have a chain of trust linking them to a trusted entity, and whether the 
system treats all entities identically. This attack achieve two main goals: selfishness and 
denial-of-service.  
 Privacy Violation 
The inferences on driver’s personal data could be made, and thus violating his or her 
privacy. The vulnerability lies in the periodic and frequent vehicular network traffic: Safety 
and traffic management messages, transaction based communications (e.g., automated 
payments).  
 In the Case of an Accident 
In the worst case, colluding attackers can clone each other, but this would require 
retrieving the security material and having full trust between the attackers. In cases where 
liability is involved, drivers may be tempted to cheat with some information that can 
determine the location of their car at a given time. 
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 Hidden Vehicle 
Here fabrication happens on positioning information. It follows the basic safety messaging 
protocol described; a vehicle broadcasting warnings will listen for feedback from its 
neighbors and stop its broadcasts if it realizes that at least one of these neighbors is better 
positioned for warning other vehicles. The hidden vehicle attack consists in deceiving vehicle 
A into believing that the attacker B is better placed for forwarding the warning message, thus 
leading to silencing A and making it hidden to other vehicles. This ultimately stops the 
dissemination of the warning message, hence causing a DoS. 
 Tunnel 
Since GPS signals disappear in tunnels, an attacker may exploit this temporary loss of 
positioning information to inject false data once the vehicle leaves the tunnel and before it 
receives an authentic position update. An area jammer from the attacker, which results in the 
same effects, can also replace the physical tunnel in this example. 
 Sinkhole Attack 
In sinkhole attack, an intruder attracts surrounding nodes with unfaithful routing 
information, and then performs selective forwarding or alters the data passing through it. The 
attacking node tries to offer a very attractive link e.g. to a gateway. Therefore, a lot of traffic 
bypasses this node. Besides simple traffic analysis, other attacks like selective forwarding or 
denial of service that can be combined with the sinkhole attack. 
3.5.4.2   Attacks on Sensor Networks 
Wireless sensor networks are a subclass of wireless networks in general, so most kinds of 
attacks that can be directed at wireless networks can be directed at WSN. There are various 
ways to classify attacks on WSNs such as by attacker locations (outside and inside attacks), 
network layers (including attacks on physical, link, network, transportation, and application 
layers.), Passive or Active attack, and the purpose of the attacks. WSN breed a whole new set 
of attacks that can be classified into “ sensor-level attacks” and “ laptop-level attacks” [77]. In 
the following, we describe the various attacks a few detail as stated in [71, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 
82, 83]. 
 Collision 
An adversary may strategically cause collisions in specific packets such as ACK control 
messages. A possible result of such collisions is the costly exponential back off in certain 
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media access control protocols. Whenever collision occurs, the nodes should retransmit 
packets affected by collision, thus leading to multiple retransmissions. 
 Selective Forwarding Attack 
Many sensor network routing protocols are based on the assumption that participating 
nodes will faithfully forward received packets. In a selective forwarding attack, compromised 
or malicious nodes may selectively forward some packets while dropping other packets. 
Selective forwarding attacks can take many forms. An adversary can drop packets arbitrarily, 
attempt to give unreasonable priority to its own messages, or misdirect traffic flows. 
 Hello Flood Attack 
It is an attack by utilizing unidirectional connections between nodes. Many protocols 
require nodes to broadcast Hello packets to announce themselves to their neighbors, and a 
node receiving such a packet may assume that it is within (normal) radio range of the sender. 
This assumption may be false because of the well-known unidirectional problem in ad hoc 
networks.  An attacker may use a high-powered transmitter to trick a large area of nodes into 
believing they are neighbors of that transmitting node. If the attacker falsely broadcasts a 
superior route to the base station, all of these nodes will attempt transmission to the attacking 
node, despite many being out of radio range in reality. In this type of attack, all nodes will be 
responding to HELLO floods and wasting the energies. 
 Resource Depletion Attack 
In this type of attack, a malicious node tries to deplete resources of other nodes in a 
network. The typical resources that are targeted are battery power, bandwidth, and 
computational power. Attacks could be in the form of unnecessary requests for routes, very 
frequent generation of beacon packets, or forwarding of stale packets to other nodes. 
 Desynchronization 
It is a case of disruption of an existing connection. An adversary attempts to disrupt the 
communication between two legitimate nodes by repeatedly forging messages to these nodes. 
If timed correctly, an attacker may degrade or even prevent the ability of the end hosts to 
exchange data successfully, thus causing them instead to waste energy by attempting to 
recover from errors, which never really existed.  
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 Node Replication Attack 
An attacker attempts to add a node to an existing WSN by replicating (i.e., copying) the 
node identifier of an already existing node in the network. A node replicated and joined to the 
network in this manner can potentially cause severe disruption in message communication in 
the WSN by corrupting the packets and forwarding them to wrong routes. This may also lead 
to network partitioning and communication of false sensor readings, it is possible to copy the 
cryptographic keys and use these keys for message communication from the replicated node. 
 Clock Unsynchronization  
Time synchronization is a critical building block in distributed WSN. Time 
unsynchronization can disrupt sleep scheduling. An attacker node can send a falsified 
synchronization message to its neighbor during this time exchange period. This will make 
other nodes calculate an incorrect phase offset and skew. 
 Injection Attack 
After the attacker has clandestinely intruded into the WSN network, he may impersonate a 
few of the sensor nodes (or even sink nodes) and may inject malicious data into the network. 
The malicious data might be false advertisement of neighbor-node information to other nodes, 
leading to impersonation of sink nodes and aggregation of all data. 
 Node Compromise 
Node compromise is one of the most common and detrimental attacks in WSN. As sensors 
can be deployed in harsh environments such as a battlefield, ocean bed, or the edge of an 
active volcano. This enables an adversary to steal cryptographic information, view and alter 
their programming, and damage or replace their hardware. Tamper-resistant packaging and 
camouflaging to prevent the attacker from easily locating motes are possibilities. 
 Misdirection 
By forwarding messages along wrong paths, an attacker misdirects them, perhaps by 
advertising false routing updates. An attacker could inflict DoS on a particular sender by 
diverting only traffic originating from the victim node. A receiver could likewise be denied 
service if the attacker diverts traffic away from the node. An attacker can also forge a source 
address when sending a request, so that the response will return to the victim. This could be 
done to confuse the victim or to flood it, if a service provides a mechanism for traffic 
amplification. 
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3.6   Security Attack Countermeasures 
Attacks on wireless networks become more sophisticated, the demand for new security 
solutions is continually increasing. Hence, an array of new security schemes have been 
designed and implemented. Most of these schemes have been designed to provide solutions 
on a layer-by-layer basis rather than on a per-attack basis; in doing so, they have left a gap 
between layers that may lead to cross-layer attacks. In this section, we will explain some of 
the countermeasures to security attacks [5, 41, 61, 63, 71, 80, 84]. 
One defense technique is to use tamper-resistant hardware in sensor nodes. However, the 
cost of current tamper-resistant hardware is too high to be installed in each sensor node. 
Effective key management schemes can reduce the damage of node tampering. Another 
intrinsic deterrent to tampering is the physical distribution of the network, that is, the 
geographic separation of individual nodes. Protection measures outside the scope of the WSN 
may be sufficient to discourage tampering attacks.  Another approach is to prevent detection 
of the nodes. Camouflaging the packaging, hiding the device, and using Low Probability of 
Intercept (LPI) radio techniques are among the possibilities. 
Detection of a collision in wireless networks with one’s own transmission is difficult. 
Error-correcting codes can be used to provide certain defense to the collision attack. However, 
error-correcting codes would not work if many bits received were corrupted. 
One defense against flooding attack is to limit the number of connections that a node can 
request (in a period of time). Some researchers propose to use client puzzles to defend against 
DoS attack. Another approach describe principles for stateless connection management. This 
approach securely stores the server’s state in all messages, requiring the client to return it with 
every future response.  The need for protocols that create traffic asymmetries, such as area 
multicast, should be carefully weighed against their potential to allow traffic amplification 
attacks. A final strategy is to provide a way to detect the source of the flooding using a trace 
back mechanism. Existing schemes are IP-based and are appropriate for the Internet’s scale 
and structure. 
Using multiple disjoint routing paths and diversity coding can mitigate the effect of the 
Selective Forwarding attack. These defenses lessen the probability that a message will 
encounter an adversary along all routes to the destination. Diversity coding sends encoded 
messages along multiple paths so that the originals can be reconstructed to conceal message 
loss, without the cost of full duplication. 
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For Misdirection attack, untrusted adversaries should authenticate routing updates to 
prevent malicious modification. A freshness mechanism can protect against replay attacks, 
while cryptographic integrity checks protect against unauthorized modification of a message 
while in transit. 
Because a malicious node utilizing a large transmission power to generate asymmetric 
links between it and other legitimate nodes, one intuitive defense against such an attack 
causes a HELLO flood attack is to verify the bi-directionality of a link between two 
“neighboring” nodes. Authentication is also a possible solution. Nodes can use a trusted third 
party to verify the authenticity of each of their neighbors before forwarding messages to them. 
Impersonation threats are mitigated by applying strong authentication mechanisms. 
Authentication provides a party to be able to trust the origin of data it receives or stores. It 
usually is performed in every layer by application of digital signatures, keyed fingerprints 
over routing messages, different information (configuration or status), or exchanged payload 
data of the used services. Digital signatures and public-key cryptography requires relatively 
significant computation power and secure key management, which is inappropriate for 
wireless ad hoc network capabilities. Lighter solutions include keyed hash functions or a 
priori negotiated and certified keys and session identifiers.  
In order to guard against location disclosure attacks, the technique preferred is the use of 
pseudo identities. However, this gives rise to another problem of maintaining and updating the 
list of identities that the node is using. 
To prevent trust attacks, stronger access control mechanisms are required (Authentication, 
Authorization, and Accounting or AAA). In order to force the nodes and users to respect the 
trust hierarchy, cryptographic techniques, e.g., encryption, public key certificates, shared 
secrets, etc., can be employed. 
There have been some proposals recently to protect networks from wormhole attacks by 
detecting such attacks. The authors introduce the concept of leashes to detect wormhole 
attacks. A leash is any information added to a packet in order to restrict the distance that the 
packet is allowed to travel. A leash is associated with each hop. Thus, each transmission of a 
packet requires a new leash. Two types of leashes are considered, namely geographical 
leashes and temporal leashes. A geographical leash is intended to limit the distance between 
the transmitter and the receiver of a packet. A temporal leash provides an upper bound on the 
lifetime of a packet. Another approach for detecting wormhole attacks. In this case, the 
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authors assume the presence of directional antennae. The approach here is based on the use of 
packet arrival direction to detect that packets are arriving from the proper neighbors. Such 
information is possible due to the use of directional antennae. This information about the 
direction of packet arrival is expected to lead to accurate information about the set of 
neighbors of a node. As a result, wormhole attacks can be detected since such attacks emanate 
from false neighbors. 
Some researchers envisaged a simple, yet effective, mechanism to prevent the resource 
consumption attacks (sleep deprivation), particularly in MANETs that use AODV as the 
routing protocol. In this mechanism, every node monitors and computes the respective RREQ 
rates of its neighbors. If the RREQ rate of a neighbor is found to exceed a threshold defined a 
priori, the node blacklists the neighbor and drops further RREQs from that particular 
neighbor. 
A simple way to address the rushing attack is to allow for randomized selection of route 
request messages. Thus, every node is expected to collect a threshold number of route 
requests. Following this, the node can randomly choose to forward a route request from 
among the received requests. 
Authentication of nodes is one of the major approaches against such Byzantine attacks. 
Authentication and integrity of packets are generally done using cryptographic techniques 
such as PKI. 
To detect a link spoofing attack, some researchers proposed a location information-based 
detection method using cryptography with a Global Positioning System (GPS) and a time 
stamp. This approach requires each node to advertise its position obtained by the GPS and the 
time stamp to enable each node to obtain the location information of the other nodes. This 
approach detects the link spoofing by calculating the distance between the two nodes that 
claim to be neighbors and checking the likelihood that the link is based on a maximum 
transmission range. The main drawback of this approach is that it might not work in a 
situation where not all MANET nodes are equipped with a GPS. 
In order to protect MANETs from replay attacks, the solution based on time stamps and 
asymmetric encryption. The solution simply compares the current time with the time stamp 
embedded in the received control messages from other nodes. If the time stamp in a received 
control packet deviates much from the current time, the receiving node considers it a possible 
replay attack. 
 Chapter 3                                                                                     Security in Wireless Networks 
41 
  
The order to prevent Link withholding attacks, the authors proposed a detection technique 
based on the observation of both a TC message and a HELLO message generated by the 
Multipoint Relay (MPR) nodes. If a node does not hear a TC message from its MPR node 
regularly but hears only a HELLO message, a node judges that the MPR node is suspicious 
and can avoid the attack by selecting one or more additional MPR nodes. Similarly, some 
researchers has proposed an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to detect TC link and message 
withholding in the OLSR protocol. 
For mitigation of Repudiation attacks at application layer, there is a host of techniques that 
can be employed. In a network with a firewall installed, the firewall can provide access 
control, user authentication, packet filtering, and a logging and accounting service. 
Application layer firewalls can effectively prevent many attacks, and application-specific 
modules. 
The most common defense against jamming attacks is the use of spread-spectrum 
communication. In frequency hopping, a device transmits a signal on a frequency for a short 
period of time, changes to a different frequency, and repeats. The transmitter and receiver 
must be coordinated. Direct sequence spreads the signal over a wide band, using a 
pseudorandom bit stream. A receiver must know the spreading code to distinguish the signal 
from noise. Frequency-hopping schemes are somewhat resistant to interference from an 
attacker who does not know the hopping sequence. 
3.7   Cellular Network Security 
This section present the security of the cellular network. In fact, the security of the cellular 
network is the security of each aspect of the network, that is, radio access network, core 
network, Internet connection, and PSTN connection [85]. 
3.7.1   Security in First-Generation Mobile Systems (1G) 
In fact, there is no security provision in the first generation of cellular communication 
networks, because the first generation of cellular communications used analogue signal, 
which is difficult to provide security services. Hence, the security issues in cellular 
communications have been addressed only from the second generation of cellular 
communications with digitalized implementations [76].  
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3.7.2   Security in Second-Generation Mobile Systems (2G) 
The decisions to move from an analog system to use of a digital system led to a signiﬁcant 
improvement in the security of the system. The use of a digital system is only one of the many 
security provisions that were designed into the second generation [86]. 
3.7.2.1   Security Mechanisms in GSM 
GSM is a prominent example of cellular networks. A GSM network is composed of several 
functional entities, with specified functions and interfaces. GSM security is composed of three 
classes of protection [60]:  
Subscriber identity protection. For privacy issues, transmitting a subscriber identity in 
plain on a radio link must be avoided; 
Network access control by means of SIM cards. The major functionality of the SIM is to 
securely hold and manage confidential information to allow the GSM network to formally 
identify a subscriber’s identity; 
Radio communication encryption between a MN and the BTS. Eavesdropping on radio 
communication being significantly easier than landline communication, it is absolutely vital to 
protect the radio link. 
3.7.2.1.1   Security Flaws in GSM 
The GSM security architecture provides a reasonable level of protection, but it has some 
deficiencies. One main problem with the GSM security architecture is that it provides only 
unilateral authentication, where the subscriber is authenticated and the visited network 
operator is not. This means that someone can set up a fake base station and implement a man-
in-the-middle attack. 
Another problem is that the GSM security architecture does not provide integrity 
protection services for communications and signaling over the wireless interface. Although, it 
is true that modifying messages on-the-fly in a wireless channel is quite challenging, if the 
communication between the mobile phone and the visited network takes place through a fake 
base station, then the attacker does not need to carry out the modifications in the wireless 
channel, but it can implement the attack within the fake base station. In addition, as a stream 
cipher is used for encryption, the attacker can easily manipulate individual bits in encrypted 
messages without decrypting them. Of course, if the messages carry parts of a voice 
communication, then the attacker can only achieve some distortion, but it is very unlikely that 
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it can alter the true content of the communication in an unnoticeable way. It can still attack 
the signaling information. Moreover, besides voice communications, cellular networks are 
increasingly used for data communications, where flipping a single bit in a message can have 
devastating consequences. Additional reasons for a new design include the short length of the 
encryption key (practically 54 bits only), and the weaknesses discovered in the commonly 
used implementation of the A3 and A8 algorithms, which, under specific conditions, allow an 
attacker to compromise the long-term secret key of the subscriber and clone her SIM card 
[87]. 
In brief, major GSM security flaws find their origin in the lack of any form of mutual 
authentication, in the possible yet unfortunate plain text transmission of secrets and in 
cryptanalytic weaknesses of the A3, A5 and A8 ciphers. The 3GPP community has identified 
these flaws and provisions have been added to the UMTS standard [60]. 
3.7.3   Security in Third Generation Mobile System (3G) 
In fact, the prominent improvements of the 3rd generation of cellular communication 
networks over the 2nd generation ones include the improved security algorithms, and different 
radio frequency ranges providing larger communication bandwidth, and improved security 
architecture (mutual authentication versus one-way authentication). This means that a network 
has to authenticate itself to the mobile users, apart from the users needing to authenticate 
themselves to the network [76]. The whole 3G security was designed based on three 
fundamental principles [88]: 
 The security for 3G will build on the security features of 2G systems. Some of the 
robust features of 2G systems will be retained; 
 The 3G security will improve on the security of the 2G systems. Some security holes 
and disadvantages of 2G systems will be addressed and corrected in 3Gsystems; 
 3G security will offer new features and will secure new services offered by 3G.  
3.7.4   Security in Fourth Generation Mobile System (4G) 
Security turns out to be one of the major problems in fourth generation (4G) of mobile 
networks that arise at different interfaces when trying to realize such a heterogeneous system 
by integrating the existing wireless and mobile systems. Indeed, current wireless systems use 
very different and difficult to combine proprietary security mechanisms, typically relying on 
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the associated user and infrastructure management means. It is generally impossible to apply a 
security policy to a system consisting of different heterogeneous subsystems [89]. 
 Vulnerabilities of Service Provider Networks  
A 4G system encompassing different technologies has to support complex management 
mechanisms (control systems, signaling, etc.), which considerably add to the system 
complexity and thus represent a major vulnerability per se. This is especially true for a multi-
provider and thus multi-authority environment where a mutual preliminary user network trust 
does not necessarily exist and must be established by some means. The serving network 
protection is one of the critical points to ensure service continuity and investment in new 
infrastructures. 
 User Vulnerabilities  
The user device is vulnerable to attacks by other devices involved in the provision of the 
consumed services (impostors, data modifications, data sniffing, man-in-the-middle) and by 
devices consuming services provided by the user device (denial of service, abuse). Connected 
to multiple interfaces over several providers the device is naturally multi-homed. It is exposed 
potentially to all attacks over the established connections, including malicious code intrusion 
(viruses, spyware, and worms). A 4G user needs a particular protection to ensure his/her 
anonymity and an offer-consistent and verifiable billing. Without any protection, in an 
international multi-provider 4G environment, a user can be an easy target for both price fraud 
(charging wrong prices, charging incorrect usage) and user tracking. 
 Heterogeneous Security 
The security solutions proposed by the wireless technologies are limited to the identified 
needs. They are thus different from technology to technology reflecting its expected usage. 
Very often, they fail to fulfill the security requirements, typically because of conceptual or 
implementational flaws. However, even if their implementation is correct, their scope is 
naturally wrong: as access security, they aim to provide link security, but ultimately providers 
need service access security and users need personal data security. How can the defined 
security policy for the entire system be applied and enforced to all system entities given that 
the available solutions are different, potentially flawed, and limited to system parts?.  
For instance, if the security policy identifies link encryption as a necessary confidentiality 
implementation, how can this be universally activated and with which keys and properties? 
How can we guarantee an adequate, comparable strength of the different encryption 
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mechanisms? What to do with the technologies that do not provide link encryption? The 
security policy must consider these cases and provide answers to such questions. 
3.8   Security in WLANs  
WLANs need to support all security applications in daily work, life, and entertainment, 
such as downloading large volumes of confidential data, streaming High Definition (HD) 
video and audio in a confidential CEO meeting. A number of IEEE 802.11 standards specify 
security requirements of WLAN. In this section, we will explain briefly some of the security 
aspects of the WLAN. 
3.8.1   WLAN Security Aspects 
Considering that it does not stop at the physical boundaries or perimeters of a wired 
network, wireless communication has significant implications on the security aspects of 
modern networking environment. WLAN technology has, precisely for that reason, built in 
the following mechanisms, which are meant to enhance the level of security for wireless data 
communication. 
3.8.1.1   Service Set Identifier (SSID) 
Network access control can be implemented using an SSID associated with a single AP or 
a group of APs [90]. An SSID is a unique identifier of up to 32 characters that is attached to 
the data sent over a wireless LAN and acts as a password when a wireless LAN device tries to 
connect to an AP [91]. 
3.8.1.2   Device Authentication  
The 802.11 specification provides two modes of authentication: open authentication and 
shared key authentication.  
Open Authentication is a null authentication algorithm. It involves sending a challenge, 
but the AP will grant any request for authentication. It is simple and easy, mainly due to 
802.11 compliancy with handheld devices that do not have the CPU capabilities required for 
complex authentication algorithms [92].  
Shared Key Authentication is the second authentication mode specified in the 802.11 
standard. This involves a shared secret key to authenticate the wireless LAN adapter to the 
AP. The shared−key authentication approach provides a better degree of authentication than 
the open system approach [91].  
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3.8.1.3   MAC Address Filtering 
A client computer can be identified by the unique MAC address of its 802.11 network 
card, while an AP or group of APs can be identified by an SSID [93]. MAC address filtering 
provides improved security, but it is best suited to small networks where the MAC address list 
can be efficiently managed [90]. 
3.8.1.4   Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) 
The first security scheme provided in the series of IEEE 802.11 standards is Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP), specified as part of the 802.11b Wi-Fi standard. WEP was 
originally designed to provide security for WLANs [94]. The principal aim of the security 
implemented in 802.11 is to address the need for authentication and confidentiality. The 
protocol is based on a symmetric key, shared between the AP and the station. WEP aims at 
covering the lack of physical security akin to WLANs with security mechanisms based on 
cryptography. WEP suffers from various design flaws and some exposure in the underlying 
cryptographic techniques that seriously undermine its security claims [31]. 
3.8.1.4.1   WEP’s Security Problems 
Researchers have found several security flaws in the WEP that severely undermine its 
encryption and authentication capabilities. We can say the WEP protocol presents some 
significant weaknesses [95]. 
 Lack of Proper Integrity Protection: WEP uses CRC-32 for integrity protection. CRC-
32 is not a keyed integrity algorithm and is highly susceptible to collisions, and thus is 
ineffective as an integrity algorithm. 
 WEP’s use of RC4 has several serious flaws: In summary, RC4 itself has some 
vulnerabilities that an attacker might exploit, and WEP’s design of reusing the key 
with an IV increases the potential for related keys. The 802.11 protocols also provide 
opportunities for the attacker to gain access to cleartext and the corresponding 
ciphertext. 
 Lack of Replay Protection: WEP does not support replay protection. Thus even if 
confidentiality and message integrity were effective, an adversary can replay 
previously sent packets. The receiver would have no way of telling that the packet is 
legitimate or a replay.  
 Lack of Mutual Authentication and Key Management: The shared-key authentication 
mechanism only allows the responder to authenticate the initiator, but not vice versa. It 
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does not define any specifications for key management and merely recommends the 
shared use of group keys. The distribution of shared group keys are difficult, if not 
impossible, to control, and the fact that any member of a group can pretend to be 
another member of the group [96]. 
3.8.1.5   802.1x 
Because of the security gaps in the WEP encryption specification, which previously 
mentioned, the industry developed authentication methods based on 802.1x specification, 
which was originally designed for wired networks [97]. It is a standard for port-based network 
access control, and offers an effective framework for authenticating and controlling user 
traffic, and for keys periodical refresh [98]. After successful authentication, a virtual port is 
opened on the access point for network access, while communications are blocked if 
authentication fails [99]. Many wireless network equipment manufacturers and software 
developers have adopted yet another IEEE standard, 802.1x, to add another layer of security 
to their networks [100]. 
The advantages of 802.1x authentication includes the following (1) every user in the 
network can be identified and authenticated; (2) it supports extensible authentication 
technologies, such as token cards, certificate/smart cards, and one-time passwords; and (3) it 
supports key managements, including key management and key reproduction. 
However, even though 802.1x was aimed at improving user authentication of the original 
802.11 security, some researchers are found flaws, which an attacker could launch several 
attacks, such as session hijacking and man-in-the-middle attacks. These security problems 
underline the weaknesses within the 802.1x design [97]. 
3.8.1.6   WPA 
The Wi-Fi Alliance developed Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) as a means to provide 
enhanced protection from targeted attacks, which is based on those components of the 802.11i 
standard that are stable and may be deployed on existing 802.11 network and client equipment 
with a software upgrade [90]. Two optional authentication mechanisms are offered to WPA 
users according to different scenarios, 802.1x authentication framework together with 
extensible authentication protocol (EAP) for enterprise WLAN security (Enterprise mode), or 
simpler pre-shared key (PSK) authentication for the home or small office network which does 
not have an authentication server (Consumer mode). 
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WPA uses Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP). TKIP scrambles the keys using a 
hashing algorithm and adds an integrity-checking feature that verifies that the keys haven’t 
been tampered with. WPA improves on WEP by increasing the IV from 24 bits to 48. 
Rollover has also been eliminated, which means key reuse is less likely to occur. WPA also 
avoids another weakness of WEP by using a different secret key for each packet [101].  
Besides the extended size of keys, some other methods are applied to generate keys 
dynamically and prevent the repetition of the same traffic keys, which is another critical issue 
to improve the security level.  Another improvement in WPA is message integrity. WPA 
addressed a Message Integrity Check (MIC) that is known as Michael. Michael is designed to 
detect invalid packets and can even take measures to prevent attacks. A complete picture of 
WPA is depicted, involving the mechanisms of confidentiality, authentication, and integrity 
[102]. 
3.8.1.6.1   Weaknesses in WPA 
Although WPA is much more secure than WEP, it suffers from some drawbacks [102]. 
Since the security depends on the secrecy of all the packet keys, if a packet key is exposed to 
the attacker, the MIC key can be found easily. Furthermore, if two packet keys with the same 
IV are disclosed, the attacker can do anything in the duration of the current temporal key, 
though the temporal key has its own lifetime and is replaced frequently. 
Besides the problem discussed above, in PSK, the administrator is allowed to specify a 
password to be known by all users for access to the AP. It is obvious that this method is 
vulnerable to an offline dictionary attack. In addition, DoS attack is also effectual for WPA. 
The malicious users can launch this attack only by initiate the access requests with a short 
interval. 
3.8.1.7   IEEE 802.11i  
The IEEE 802.11i known as WPA2, is an additional specification to provide enhanced 
WLANs’ security, WPA2 defines data confidentiality, mutual authentication, and key 
management protocols [76]. 
The main advantages of the WPA2 standard can be listed as follows: 
 Providing more excellent security by using advanced encryption algorithms; 
 Using stronger key management policies; 
 Protecting against the man-in-the-middle attacks by using the two-way authentication 
process; 
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 Providing improved message integrity by using Cipher Block Chaining Message 
Authentication Code. 
The comparison of WEP, WPA, and WPA2 can be summarized in the following table. 
 
Security Protocol WEP WPA WPA2 
Major Component IV TKIP CCMP 
Stream Cipher RC4 RC4 AES 
Key Size 40 bit 128 bit (encryption) and 
64 bit (authentication)  
128 bit 
IV Size 24 bit 48 bit 48 bit 
Key Management Not Available IEEE 802.1x/EAP IEEE 
802.1x/EAP/CCMP 
Data Integrity CRC-32 MIC CBC-MAC 
Table 3.1: The comparison of WLAN Security Protocols 
3.8.1.7.1   Weakness of IEEE 802.11i 
Although WPA2 is designed to cover up for the weaknesses of WEP, it still has its own 
drawbacks [102] [76]. First, WPA2 is costly. Due to the requirements of the implementation 
of the advanced properties designed in WPA2 (the change in devices is meaningful). 
Second, WPA2 is suffers from other new types of DoS attack derived from some particular 
features, such as reflection attack for 4-Way Handshake authentication, RSN Information 
Element Poisoning and 4-Way Handshake Blocking, and so forth.  
Third, WPA2 is also prone to attacks such as security level rollback attack, reflection 
attack, and Time Memory Trade Off (TMTO) attack. Specifically, when Pre-RSNA and 
RSNA algorithms are both used in a single WLAN, an adversary can launch a security level 
rollback attack, avoiding authentication and disclosing the default keys. 
3.8.1.8   VPNs 
Virtual private networks (VPNs) are typically used in TCP/IP−based networks to secure 
communication between remote users and a private network. Using VPN to establish such 
connectivity guarantees that the remote user is authenticated and all data over the Internet is 
transmitted in encrypted form [91].  
The same VPN technologies can also be used for secure wireless access in WLANs. In this 
scenario, the untrusted network is the wireless network. The APs are now configured for open 
access with no WEP encryption, but wireless access is isolated from the enterprise network by 
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the VPN server. The APs can be connected together via a virtual LAN or LAN that is 
deployed in the Demilitarized Zone and connected to the VPN server. The APs should still be 
configured in closed mode with SSIDs for network segmentation. Authentication and full 
encryption over the wireless network is provided through VPN servers that also act as 
firewalls and gateways to the internal private network [90].  
 The VPN approach has a number of advantages [90]. First, already deployed on many 
enterprise networks. Second, scalable to a large number of 802.11 clients. Thirdly, low 
administration requirements for 802.11 APs and clients. Fourthly, traffic to the internal 
network is isolated until VPN authentication is performed, WEP key and MAC address list 
management is not needed because of security measures created by the VPN channel itself. 
Finally, addresses general remote access with a consistent user interface in different locations 
such as at home, at work, and in an airport.  
A drawback to current VPN solutions is the lack of support for multicasting, which is a 
technique used to deliver data efficiently in real time from one source to many users over a 
network. Although the standard of 802.11i can guarantee the same security requirements as 
the wireless VPNs, the vulnerabilities in the implementations of the 802.11i standard could 
still make it less trustworthy. Another issue related to roaming between wireless networks is 
not completely transparent. Users receive a log-on dialog when roaming between VPN servers 
on a network or when the client system resumes from standby mode. In addition, in the case 
of point-to-point wireless links it is easier and more economical to deploy a network-to-
network VPN than 802.11i-based defenses, including the RADIUS server and user credentials 
database, while using 802.11i with PSK and no 802.11x is not a good security solution for a 
high throughput network-to-network link. When using a VPN solution, it is still 
recommended that client computers be equipped with personal firewall protection to provide 
increased security, including the protection against attacks by nearby wireless client systems 
[90],[76]. 
3.8.1.9   Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) 
PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), simply defined, is an infrastructure that allows the 
creation of a trusted method for providing privacy, authentication, integrity, and 
nonrepudiation in online communications between two parties [103]. For applications 
requiring higher levels of security, WLANs can integrate PKI for authentication to secure 
network transactions because it provides strong authentication through user certificates. 
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Furthermore, the user can use the same certificates in application-level security, such as 
signing and encrypting messages. Wireless PKI, handsets, and smart cards that integrate with 
WLANs are available from third-party manufactures [54]. 
3.8.1.10   Smart Card 
A smart card is a portable and tamper-resistant computer. It provides data security, data 
integrity, and personal privacy and supports mobility [89]. In wireless networks, smart cards 
provide the added feature of authentication, although they also add another layer of 
complexity. These devices are beneficial in situations that require authentication beyond 
simple usernames and passwords. Furthermore, they are portable, and hence users can 
securely access their networks from various locations. Organizations can use smart cards in a 
two-factor authentication by combining it with biometrics [54]. 
3.8.1.11   Biometrics 
Biometrics uses methods for unique recognition of humans based upon one or more 
intrinsic physical or behavioral traits. In computer science, particularly, biometrics is used as 
a form of identity access management and access control. It is also used to identify 
individuals in groups that are under surveillance [104]. 
For higher levels of security, biometrics can be integrated with wireless laptops, wireless 
smart card, or other wireless devices and used to authenticate the user to access the wireless 
network. The advantage of modern biometric technology is that it is very convenient and 
provides for higher security than most other forms of authentication [103]. Biometric 
authentication combined with encryption is being used to improve the security of encryption 
systems. To make brute force attacks obsolete, a biometric key with a person’s unique 
personal identification can be added to or can replace the normal encryption key. Biometric 
encryption also makes key management unnecessary because the encryption key becomes a 
unique physical characteristic of a person and is hard to break [54]. 
3.8.1.12   Firewalls 
A firewall can be defined as a collection of components (hardware and/or software) that is 
placed between two networks. The following properties exist, all traffic in either direction 
must pass through the firewall, only traffic authorized by the local security policy will be 
allowed to pass, the firewall itself is immune to penetration [105]. Implementing personal 
firewall software on client computers can provide some protection against attacks, especially 
 Chapter 3                                                                                     Security in Wireless Networks 
52 
  
for clients accessing public WLANs. Organizations can set up these personal firewalls to be 
centrally or individually managed [47]. In effect, a firewall divides a network into a more-
trusted zone internal to the firewall, and a less-trusted zone external to the firewall. This is 
useful if you do not want external users to access a particular host or service within your site. 
A firewall may also impose restrictions on outgoing traffic, to prevent certain attacks and to 
limit losses if an adversary succeeds in getting access inside the firewall. Firewalls may be 
used to create multiple zones of trust, such as a hierarchy of increasingly trusted zones. A 
common arrangement involves three zones of trust: the internal network, the demilitarized 
zone (DMZ), and the rest of the Internet [106]. 
3.8.1.12.1   Weaknesses of Firewalls 
According to [107], the weaknesses of a software firewall are, may slow down system 
applications since it is installed on the system itself and requires more memory and disk 
space, may also prove costly because such a firewall has to be purchased separately for each 
computer on the network. It maybe unwieldy to remove from the system, such firewalls 
cannot be configured to mask IP addresses (they only close unused ports and monitor traffic 
to and from open ports), and may not be capable of fast reaction. While the weaknesses of a 
hardware firewall are, they treat outgoing traffic as safe and may fail if a malware is 
attempting to connect to the internet from within, they may be more complex to configure, 
they are more expensive, and takes up more physical space with its added wiring. 
3.8.1.13   Wireless IDS 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a device or software attempting to perform network 
intrusion detection and stop possible incidents/ attacks by gathering and analyzing data. These 
wireless IDSs can recognize patterns of known attacks, identify abnormal network activity, 
and detect policy violations for WLANs by monitoring and analyzing network, user, and 
system activities. Also, like traditional signature based IDSs and anomaly-based IDSs, 
wireless IDSs can generate intrusion alters according to either the predefined signatures or the 
observed abnormal network behavior [76]. 
3.9   Security in WPAN 
Although a wireless PAN will generally, have a more limited range than a WLAN, 
ensuring security will remain an important implementation issue, and a number of challenges 
exist that make this task difficult. 
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First, access to the wireless medium is open to all, including potential adversaries that 
don’t even have to be physically close to the sensor field. Second, the network may consist of 
many nodes, which are expected to operate with little human intervention for prolonged 
periods of time. Furthermore, some or all of the nodes may be mobile. As a result, attacks and 
disruptions more difficult to detect. Third, most of the nodes in a WPAN or a sensor network 
have limited energy at their disposal and the chips computational power is limited; this 
restricts the choice of cryptographic techniques that can be applied to ensure that privacy and 
integrity are adequately supported. Finally, actual nodes may be subject to damage, or even 
physical capture and subsequent subversion by a hostile adversary.  
Consequently, sophisticated techniques are required to monitor and detect possible 
intrusions and, if necessary, launch appropriate countermeasures. From the networking 
perspective, security threats may occur at different layers of the ISO/OSI model [108]. 
Bluetooth, ZigBee and NFC (Near Field Communications) have emerged as the key WPAN 
technologies. They are however subject to the usual range of security vulnerabilities found in 
wireless LANs. 
3.10   Wireless MAN Security 
Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (WMANs) provide wireless communications at 
acceptable bandwidth over much larger geographical areas compared to WLANs. WMANs 
use WiMAX technologies to provide Mobile Stations (MS) communications with Base 
Stations connected to backbone networks and the Internet. Also known as, the “last mile” 
technology, WiMAX was designed and developed to have relatively long communication 
range, that fits wonderfully in urban areas. WMANs support all secure applications that can 
run over the Internet [76]. 
3.10.1   Security in WiMAX  
Given the fact that WiMAX is intended for wide area coverage, reliable security features 
and many complex security mechanisms are adopted for authentication and confidential data 
transfer [4].  WiMax security has two goals; one is to provide privacy across the wireless 
network and the other is to provide access control to the network. Privacy is accomplished by 
encrypting connections between the subscriber station and the base station. The base station 
protects against unauthorized access by enforcing encryption of service flows across the 
network. A Privacy and Key Management (PKM) protocol is used by the base station to 
control the distribution of keying data to subscriber stations. This allows the subscriber and 
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base stations to synchronize keying data. Digital-certificate-based subscriber station 
authentication is included in the PKM to provide access control [109]. 
3.11   Wireless WAN Security 
Some of the problems related to  Wireless WAN security are a result of inherent 
vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP protocols and services, while others are a result of host 
configuration and access controls that are poorly implemented or too complex to administer. 
Additionally, the role and importance of system administration is often shortchanged in job 
descriptions, resulting in many administrators’ being, at best, part-time and poorly prepared. 
WWAN security also presents a variety of challenges depending on the access networks used; 
and when user connect via different means such as a mixture of Wireless LANs and Cellular 
data networks, the challenges compound [110].  
3.12   Security in Wireless Mesh Networks 
The potential of wireless mesh networking cannot be exploited without considering and 
adequately addressing the involved security issues. The nodes within a wireless mesh network 
function as routers relaying packets to other nodes. The number of nodes in a wireless mesh 
network increases, therefore more locations where insidious persons can view the data. In 
addition, if software permits nodes to be added without centralized control, a mechanism is 
required to ensure the node is legitimate and not a PC operated by a hacker [111]. 
3.12.1   Why Security is Important in WMNs 
Security plays a critical role in wireless networks. In WMNs, security becomes even more 
critical, for the following reasons [112]. 
 Multihop wireless network security: Many security schemes for wireless networks are 
focused on one-hop communications. The multihop architecture renders these schemes 
insufficient to protect a WMN from being attacked. 
 Multitier security: In WMNs, security is needed for wireless access from mesh clients 
to mesh routers and also for wireless connectivity among mesh routers. Mesh routers 
usually belong to a service provider, while mesh clients can be any users. Such 
features make the security issue different from that in any other wireless network such 
as wireless LANs or mobile ad hoc networks. The security mechanism for 
communications among mesh routers must be different from that in the wireless 
access part. 
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 Multisystem security: For the benefits of better wireless services, WMNs usually 
involve interoperation of multiple wireless networks such as IEEE 802.11, IEEE 
802.16, IEEE 802.15 based wireless networks. Both security architecture and schemes 
are much different from one system to another. 
3.12.2   WMN Specific Security Challenges 
 The shared nature of wireless medium, the absence of globally trusted central 
controller, and the lack of physical protection of mesh routers pose the main 
challenges for securing WMNs [113]. 
 An authentication mechanism is usually implemented with the help of Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI), which requires a globally trusted entity to issue certificates. 
However, it is impractical to maintain a globally trusted entity in WMNs.  
 The mesh routers are located outdoor, usually on rooftops or traffic light poles. 
Therefore, it is much easier for attackers to capture the mesh routers and get full 
control of the device. If a router is fully controlled by attackers, the attacks can be 
launched from that router and the information sent by the attackers will be regarded as 
authenticated by other routers.  
Other specific challenges for WMNs include [38]: 
 WMN may be dynamic because of changes in both its topology and its membership. 
Any security with a static configuration would not suffice. 
 Mesh routers and mesh clients hold significantly different characteristics such as 
mobility and power constraints. As a result, the same security solution may not work 
for both mesh routers and mesh clients. 
 There are also issues introduced by MN (Mesh Node) belonging to different 
authorities, such as selfish and greedy behavior, and trust management. 
3.13   Security in Ad Hoc Networks 
Compared with infrastructure-based wireless networks, security management for wireless 
ad hoc networks is more challenging due to unreliable communication, intermittent 
connection, node mobility, and dynamic topology [40].  As a result, security design in ad hoc 
mobile networks has to face the lack of clear line of defense. Each node in an ad hoc network 
may function as a router and forward packets for other peer nodes, unlike wired networks that 
have dedicated routers. The wireless channel is accessible to both legitimate network users 
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and malicious attackers. There is no well-defined place where traffic monitoring or access 
control mechanisms can be deployed. This makes the separation of inside from outside 
network domain obscure [114]. 
As all nodes are expected to cooperate, no a priori classification or security association can 
be made, and nodes are free to form independent sub-domains.  An additional problem with 
compromised nodes is the potential Byzantine failures wherein a set of nodes could be 
compromised such that innocent and malicious behavior cannot be distinguished. Malicious 
nodes can advertise nonexistent links, provide incorrect link state information, create new 
routing messages, and flood other nodes with routing traffic, thus causing Byzantine failures 
on the system.  The wireless links between nodes are highly susceptible to link attacks, which 
include active interfering, leakage of secret information, eavesdropping, data tampering, 
impersonation, message replay, message distortion, and denial-of-service (DoS). The presence 
of even a small number of malicious nodes could result in repeatedly compromised routes. As 
a result, the network nodes would have to rely on cycles of timeout and new route discoveries 
to communicate [115]. 
Moreover, different applications have different security requirements. The complexity and 
diversity of the field has led to a multitude of proposals, which focus on different parts of the 
problem domain. They vary between trust and key management, secure routing and intrusion 
detection, availability and cryptographic protocols [41]. A complete security solution should 
include three components of prevention, detection, and reaction. It must provide security 
properties of authentication, confidentiality, non-repudiation, integrity, and availability. It 
should be adaptive in order to trade-off service performance and security performance under 
resource limitation [40].  
3.13.1   Security Challenges 
Security is an important issue for ad hoc networks, especially for those in security-sensitive 
environments.  The unique characteristics of ad hoc networks have posed nontrivial 
challenges to security designs. 
 Resource Constraints: The wireless devices usually have limited bandwidth, memory 
and processing power [40]. For this reasons, security mechanisms for ad hoc networks 
must be lightweight in terms of communication overhead, computation complexity, 
and storage overhead [89]. 
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 Open Shared Medium: Use of open shared medium makes an ad hoc network 
susceptible to attacks such as eavesdropping, signal jamming, impersonation, message 
distortion, message injection, and cause other problems [89]. 
 Absence of infrastructure, frequent change of topology and node mobility: Ad hoc 
networks operate independently of any infrastructure, which makes inapplicable any 
classical solutions based on certification authorities and on-line servers [41]. The 
connectivity among the nodes may vary with time due to node departures, node 
arrivals, and the mobility of nodes. This emphasizes the need for secure solutions to be 
adaptive to dynamic topology [40].  
 Need to cooperate: In the absence of a router, each participant may have to relay 
packets to the other network nodes. Consequently, if one of these participants decides 
either with a “selfish” behavior or with a voluntarily malicious goal, not to relay the 
packets, it is the network operation, which is affected, and its effectiveness is reduced 
[60]. 
 Scalability: Due to the limited memory and processing power on mobile devices, the 
scalability is a key problem when we consider a large network size [40].  
 Auto-configuration: Auto-configuration seems to be an essential functionality, since it 
enables the integration of nodes into a network without requiring human intervention. 
This mechanism constitutes a target choice for malicious nodes [60]. 
3.13.2   Security in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)  
A modern vehicle can be considered as a network of sensors/actuators on wheels. VANET 
is a special kind of Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) where vehicles equipped with the 
technologies are the key constituents [74]. VANETs constitute all types of ad hoc networks 
formed by the use of short-range radios installed in private (personal consumer) and public 
(public transport and law enforcement authorities) vehicles [61]. Without security, a VANET 
system is vulnerable to a number of attacks such as propagation of false warning messages 
and suppression of actual warning messages, thereby causing accidents. This makes security a 
factor of paramount importance in building such networks.  
3.13.3   Security in WSN 
Security is very important for many sensor network applications, such as military target 
tracking and security monitoring. Providing security to small sensor nodes is challenging, due 
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to the limited capabilities of sensor nodes in terms of computation, communication, and 
energy. 
3.13.3.1   Security Goals 
Security goals in sensor networks depend on the need to know what we are going to 
protect. In addition to the security goals referred to in section 3.4 such as, Authentication, 
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Non-repudiation. We determine other security goals in 
sensor networks: Scalability, Privacy, Flexibility, Battery, life Transmission range, 
Bandwidth, Memory, Prior deployment knowledge, Resistance, Revocation, and Resilience 
[116]. 
 Scalability: Efficiency demands that sensor networks utilize a scalable secure 
technique to allow for the variations in size typical of such a network.  
 Privacy: Privacy is one of the key primitives for securing a sensor network in terms of 
disclosure of identity. To ensure privacy of the nodes, an anonymous communication 
protocol can be an effective tool for communication in the network without disclosing 
the IDs of the nodes. 
 Flexibility: Secure techniques should be able to function well in any kind of 
environments and support dynamic deployment of nodes, i.e., the techniques should be 
useful in multiple applications and allow for adding nodes at any time. One of the 
challenges in developing sensor networks is to provide high-security features with 
limited resources. 
 Prior deployment knowledge: As the nodes in sensor, networks are deployed 
randomly and dynamically, it is not possible to maintain the knowledge of every 
placement. A secure protocol should not, therefore, be aware of where nodes are 
deployed when initializing keys in the network. 
 Resistance: An adversary might attack the network by compromising a few nodes in 
the network and then replicating those nodes back into the network. A secure protocol 
must resist node replication to guard against such attacks. 
 Revocation: If an adversary invades a sensor network, the secure protocol should 
provide an efficient way to revoke compromised nodes, a lightweight method that 
does not use much of the network’s already limited capacity for communication. 
 Resilience: If a node within a sensor network is captured, the secure protocol should 
ensure that the secret information about other nodes is not revealed. Resilience also 
means conveniently making new inserted sensors to join secure communications.  
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3.13.3.2   Security Considerations in Wireless Sensor Networks 
Can security measures and cryptographic protocols in wireless sensor networks be 
considered in the same way as for other types of networks? There is some consensus that the 
answer seems to be “no”, because of some special features or considerations of sensor 
networks make it particularly challenging to provide these security services for sensor 
networks [117]. 
 The network infrastructure of a WSN is made up of small, cheap nodes may be 
deployed in public or hostile locations (such as public buildings or forward battle 
areas) in many applications. Furthermore, the large number of nodes that are deployed 
implies that each sensor node must be low cost, which makes it difficult for 
manufacturers to make them tamper resistant. Special secure memory devices would 
be needed to prevent the attacker from reading the memory. Moreover, heterogeneous 
nature of sensor nodes is an additional limitation that prevents one security solution 
[118]. 
 Traditional security mechanisms that have high overheads are not suitable for 
resource-constrained WSNs. Many security mechanisms are computationally 
expensive or require communication with other nodes or “remote” devices (e.g., for 
authorization purposes), thereby leading to energy overheads. Small sensor devices are 
also constrained in their available memory and storage capacities [83]. 
 In addition to the limitations of nodes, sensor networks provide all the limitations of a 
mobile ad hoc network. Security solutions should be decentralized and nodes must 
collaborate to achieve security [83]. 
 When in-network processing is to be performed, intermediate nodes need to access 
and modify the information contained in packets; hence, a larger number of parties is 
involved in end-to-end information transfers [117]. 
 The finite energy budget of sensor nodes opens up a particularly attractive line of 
attacks: to force victim sensor nodes to exhaust their energy budget quickly and to die. 
An additional challenge is that attackers can have much more energy at their disposal 
than the sensor nodes [117].  
3.14   Security Mechanisms 
A variety of security mechanisms such as protocols, algorithms and key management has 
been invented to counter malicious attacks. A first line of defense (traditional security 
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mechanisms) include authentication, access control, encryption, and digital signature. As a 
second line of defense, intrusion detection systems and cooperation enforcement mechanisms 
implemented in MANET can also help to defend against attacks or enforce cooperation, 
reducing selfish node behavior. This section gives an overview of basic concepts concerning 
security mechanisms [67], [41]. 
 Preventive mechanism: The conventional authentication and encryption schemes are 
based on cryptography, which includes asymmetric and symmetric cryptography. 
 Reactive mechanism: A number of malicious attacks could bypass the preventive 
mechanisms due to its design, implementation, or restrictions. An intrusion detection 
system provides a second line of defense. There are widely used to detect misuse and 
anomalies. In practice, both approaches can be combined to be more effective against 
attacks. 
3.14.1   Cryptographic Issues 
Preventive security controls are often protocols that utilize cryptography. Cryptography 
analyzes and develops methods for transforming of unsecured plaintext into ciphertext that 
can not be read by unauthorized entities. There are two main applications of cryptography: 
data encryption and data signing. 
3.14.2   Cryptographic Primitives 
Three types of cryptographic primitives are used in order to authenticate the content of 
messages exchanged among nodes: Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), 
digital signature, and one-way HMAC key chain.  
HMAC, it is applicable in case when nodes share a secret symmetric key which allow them 
to generate and verify a message authenticator hk (.), using a cryptographic one-way function. 
Digital signature is based on asymmetric key cryptography and involves much more 
computational overhead in signing/decrypting and verifying/encrypting operations. It is 
sensitive to DoS attacks because of possibility of bogus signatures. 
One-way HMAC key chain provides a cryptographic one-way function f(x), designed to 
make the input x invisible. When applied repeatedly on the input, a chain of outputs fi(x) is 
obtained. The reverse order of generation is used to authenticate messages. A message with an 
HMAC using fi (x) as the key is proven to be authentic when the sender reveals fi−1(x). 
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3.14.3   Cryptographic Algorithms 
Cryptographic algorithms perform a mathematical transformation of input data (e.g., data, 
keys) to output data to conceal it. They may use one or both mentioned security applications 
and have to be embedded into a semantic context, which usually occurs as a part of a 
cryptographic protocol. A cryptographic protocol is a procedural instruction for a series of 
processing steps and message exchanges between multiple entities, aiming to achieve specific 
security objectives. Cryptographic algorithms can be classified according to the number of 
used different keys into: 
 Hash algorithms, use no key; 
 Secret-key cryptography, use one key (symmetric algorithms); 
 Public-key cryptography, use two different keys for encryption and decryption or 
signing and signature check (asymmetric algorithms). 
3.14.4   Key Management 
Keys are an essential component of security because they allow us to read otherwise 
unintelligible messages and to sign documents, among other things. Cryptographic protocols 
use keys to authenticate entities and grant access to guarded information to those who exhibit 
their knowledge of the keys. Therefore, it is imperative that keys be securely generated and 
distributed to appropriate entities.  
Secret keys are shared between communicating entities. A secret key can be generated by 
one party and distributed to another entity, through either direct physical contact or a secure 
channel. The key can also be negotiated among entities, in which case key generation and 
distribution are accomplished simultaneously. 
In public-key cryptography, a public key is made public, while the corresponding private 
key is kept secret. A public-key certificate certifies the binding between a public key and an 
entity. Certificates are signed bindings by a trusted party whose public key is known 
beforehand. Public-key certificates can be generated and distributed through a central server 
(similar to publishing phone numbers in a phone book) or a network of nodes that provides 
such services (similar to distributing cell phone numbers by the word of mouth), or a 
combination of the two. Public-key cryptography is often used to distribute secret keys [5]. 
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3.14.5   Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
In fact, the intrusion defined as any set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, 
confidentiality, or availability of a resource [40] and Intrusion detection can be defined as the 
automated detection and subsequent generation of an alarm if an intrusion is taking place. An 
IDS is a defense mechanism that continuously monitors the network for unusual activity and 
detects adverse activities [115].  
According to [115] three intrusion detection techniques are used: anomaly detection, 
signature or misuse detection, and specification-based detection. 
 The first technique is anomaly-based intrusion detection, which profiles the symptoms 
of normal behaviors of the system such as usage frequency of commands, CPU usage 
for programs and the like. It detects intrusions as anomalies, i.e. deviations from the 
normal behaviors [40].  
 In misuse detection, decisions are made based on an intrusive process by defining 
legal or illegal behavior on the basis of observed behavior. The misuse detection 
technique involves analyzing the collected data for specific behavior patterns known 
to be consistent with specific attacks. These behavior patterns are called signatures 
[63]. 
 The last technique is specification-based intrusion detection. In this approach, assumes 
the existence of a precise protocol specification. Malicious behavior is detected by 
comparing the protocol traffic with the protocol specification. The detectors typically 
build precise models of expected behavior (e.g. by using state machines) based on the 
protocol specifications and then compare the observed behavior in the network against 
the model [63]. 
3.14.5.1   Architectures for IDS in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks 
As we know, the nature of wireless ad hoc networks makes them very vulnerable to attack. 
To tackle these challenges, several possible IDS architectures exist including standalone IDS, 
distributed and cooperative IDS and hierarchical IDS [69]. 
3.14.5.1.1   Standalone IDS 
Each node has its own IDS and detects attacks independently in this architecture. There is 
no cooperation between nodes and all decisions are based on information collected by 
individual nodes. 
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3.14.5.1.2   Distributed and Cooperative IDS 
In this architecture, each node has an IDS agent and makes local detection decisions by 
itself. At the same time, all the nodes participate in a global detection process. This 
architecture is more suitable for a flat network configuration than a cluster-based multilayered 
one. 
3.14.5.1.3   Hierarchical IDS 
In this architecture, each node has its own IDS agent responsible for local intrusion 
detection. At the same time, the IDS agent of the cluster head is responsible for both local and 
global intrusion detection. Total network coverage is assured by activating global agents in 
every cluster head. However, the clustering also adds possible points of attack and overhead 
and complexity in the creation and maintenance of clusters.  
3.14.5.1.4   Mobile Agent for IDS 
Mobile-agent-based IDS can be considered either a distributed and cooperative intrusion 
detection technique or it can be used in combination with hierarchical IDS. An agent is 
mobile due to its ability to move through the network, interact with nodes, and collect 
information from them. The intrusion-detection tasks are distributed and assigned to these 
mobile agents. Each mobile agent is assigned a specific task and acts upon the information it 
collects along its moving path.  
There are many advantages of using mobile agents. First, power consumption of the 
network is reduced because the tasks are distributed and each node holds only some of the 
tasks and not all of them. Secondly, the overall system fault tolerance increases because the 
IDS tasks are distributed to different parts of the network; when some agents are destroyed or 
parts of the network are separated, the other agents can remain functional. Third, as the 
mobile agent may be platform independent, the IDS can run under different operating system 
environments. Furthermore, when distributed mobile agents replace a central processing unit, 
the computational load is divided between machines and the network load is reduced. 
However, these mobile agents still need to be run in a secure module on each node in order to 
protect themselves on remote hosts. 
3.14.5.2   Architecture for Intrusion Detection in MANET 
In order to create an architecture there are some fundamental questions that need to be 
considered. A key question that will have to be answered first is related to the roles that a 
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node can have in a MANET intrusion detection architecture. These roles include the 
following [63]: 
 Self-Detection: A node may run a detector that focuses on monitoring the node itself 
to see whether it is behaving as expected. It could do this for example by monitoring 
the messages that the node itself is sending to other nodes. Since this detector has 
perfect knowledge of the state of the node, it can detect malicious behavior without 
false positives.  
 Local Detection: A node may run a detector that detects attacks based on evidence 
available locally. This may include evidence from packets received by the node, 
forwarded by the node (as part of the routing process), or packets that have been 
observed by the node going through the wireless link (by eavesdropping on the link). 
 Data Collection: Since a number of attacks in a MANET environment cannot be 
detected locally with a high degree of certainty by a single node, it is necessary for 
nodes to collect intrusion detection evidence and share it with other nodes. This data is 
then shared either with everybody or with some subset of the nodes, depending on the 
specific IDS architecture used. 
The next key question is related to the number of nodes that need to be part of the intrusion 
detection architecture as well as the role of each. If our goal is to detect all the attacks for all 
possible mobility scenarios. If we can utilize only a subset of the total number of nodes in the 
intrusion detection process, it is important to decide what role each node needs to play in the 
intrusion detection process. There is no general answer to this question that is well suited for 
all situations. The answer depends on several parameters, such as: 
 The degree of certainty required for the detection. If we need to detect intrusions under 
almost all conditions with minimal false positives then a very large percentage of 
nodes will need to execute the IDS. 
 The mobility scenario expected for the specific application and mission. For example, 
in a military environment, units tend to move together and be close to each other for a 
long period of time. In such cases a small number of nodes running IDS placed within 
a unit may be able to detect most intrusions. 
 Mode of monitoring. If nodes are capable of monitoring in the promiscuous mode 
whereby each node can receive and analyze any packet transmitted by any of its 
neighbors, then each node can monitor a larger portion of the traffic. If this is not 
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possible, then a node might be restricted to monitoring traffic that it relays. In this 
case, each node can monitor a relatively smaller portion of the traffic. 
 The connectivity environment. In a flat area where there are few obstructions, most 
nodes usually have multiple neighbors that can observe their behavior. In that case, a 
small percentage of nodes may have visibility of most of the traffic and therefore be 
able to detect most attacks. 
 The capabilities of nodes. It may only be possible for a small subset of the nodes to 
run IDS due to limitations on resources such as power, CPU processing, storage, and 
bandwidth. In that case, there may not be a choice and the nodes that have available 
resources and the necessary capabilities will have to execute the IDS functions. 
 Number of nodes that need protection. It may be critical to protect only a small subset 
of the nodes that either store important data or run critical servers. The specific 
mission or application may be willing to tolerate attacks against a number of other 
nodes. In that case, it is probably more important to place nodes running IDS around 
the important nodes. A few additional nodes running IDS scattered throughout the rest 
of the network might then suffice. 
 Percentage of compromised nodes that can be tolerated. Certain applications can 
continue functioning at an acceptable level even after some percentage of the nodes 
has been compromised. If that is the case then a smaller percentage of IDS nodes may 
be sufficient to ensure that no more than the acceptable percentage of nodes has been 
compromised. 
3.15   Conclusion 
In fact, to obtain a security in wireless networks equivalent to that provided by wired 
networks is a very hard task. Many constraints must be overcome in order to benefit from an 
ad hoc network: access to the radio channel, mobility and energy management, etc. 
 Although the covered topic may not be an exhaustive representation of all the security 
issues in wireless networks, But we have tried to give an overview of security in wireless 
networks with more detail with regard to ad hoc networks security. we have explained the 
security goals, types of attacks, security attack countermeasures, aspects and mechanisms of 
security, etc. in general, we do represent a rich and useful sample of the strategy and content 
within wireless network security. In the next chapter, we will present the mobile agent 
paradigm and the contribution of it to ad hoc networks security.                                               .







Mobile Agent Security 
 
                                                                    And trust no agent; for beauty is a witch against  
                                                                                                whose charms faith melteth into blood. 
  




This chapter gives an overview about the concept and the security issues related to the 
mobile agent paradigm such as security threats and requirements. It gives the main solutions 
for keeping a mobile agent platform secure against a malicious mobile agent. Similarly, it 
presents a set of solutions for ensuring the security of mobile agents against illegitimate 
platforms. We finished the chapter by reviewing and discussing some relevant previous 
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4.1   Introduction 
The mobile agent has received considerable attention in recent years for its wide 
applications in various areas of computing technology. This has led to deal more efficiently 
and elegantly with the dynamic, heterogeneous, and open environment, which is today’s 
wireless network. 
A mobile agent is an active entity that can act within a distributed system of agent places 
on behalf of its user, following a given task. A place provides an abstract representation of a 
host and its services. The agent can autonomously migrate from one place in the network to 
another during its execution. While it computes, it is able to observe its environment and to 
adapt dynamically to changes. It can continue its computations asynchronously even if the 
user that has started it is (temporarily) not connected to the distributed system any more, i.e. 
the mobile agent paradigm is able to support mobile computing quite naturally. By moving 
the agent to the host on which data resides, communication latency may be reduced in many 
cases. Furthermore, by processing the data and sending only the relevant results, the 
consumption of bandwidth and/or the connection time can be reduced, which is again an 
advantage for mobile computing [119]. 
Although mobile agent technology extends the capabilities of traditional distributed 
network applications such as the client server model, there is an increase in the security 
requirements. Mobile agent–based systems are subject to several security threats. Indeed, 
since mobile agents migrate through open and insecure networks and are executed on hosts of 
uncertain trust, security is a major concern [64]. 
4.2   Overview of Mobile Agent 
Mobile agents provide a new programming paradigm and a very new scenario to develop 
complex applications. In some cases, this technology is one of the few available (often the 
only) to implement applications with special requirements, such as wireless networks. 
4.2.1   Definition  
There are many definitions of an agent. The major reason for this variance is due to the 
exponential growth of diversity and functionality. According to the most accepted definition 
of software agents, agents are simply computer systems that are capable of autonomous action 
in some environment in order to meet their design objectives. An agent will typically sense its 
environment, and will have available a repertoire of actions that can be executed to modify 
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the environment, which may appear to respond non-deterministically to the execution of these 
actions [120].  
Mobile agents (MAs) add to regular agents the ability to travel to multiple locations in the 
network, by saving their state and restoring it in the new host. As they travel, they work on 
behalf of the user, such as collecting information or delivering requests. This mobility greatly 
enhances the productivity of each computing element in the network and creates a powerful 












Figure 4.1: Shows the Mobile Agent Concept 
Mobile agents require a software infrastructure that provides them security and data 
protection. This infrastructure includes protocols, rules for safe mobility, and directions and 
directories with information about all available hosts [122].  
4.2.2   Structure of Mobile Agents 
Mobile agents consist of three components: code, data, and execution state. The code 
contains the logic of the agent, and all agents of the same type use the same code. The code 
must be separated from the code of the agency so that it can be transferred alone to another 
agency, and the code must be identifiable and readable for an agency. 
The second component of an agent is data. This term corresponds to the values of the 
agent’s instance variables if we assume an agent to be an instance of a class in object-oriented 
languages. The data is sometimes also called the object state. It is important to note that not 
all data items an agent can access are part of its object state. 
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The third component is the execution state. The difference between object and execution 
state information is that the agent itself directly controls the elements of the object state, 
whereas the processor and the operating system usually control execution state information 
[123]. 
4.2.3   Properties of Mobile Agents 
The mobile agent paradigm provides some very interesting properties. There are several 
property but we will mention the most important from our point of view [119, 122, 124].  
 Mobility: Transport itself from host to host within a network. This is the most 
distinguishing property from other kinds of agents. Note that a moving agent will 
carry its identity, execution state, and program code so that it can be authenticated and 
hence can resume its execution on the destination site after the move.  
 Autonomy: Agents are capable of operating without the direct intervention of humans 
or others, and have some kind of control over their actions and internal state. 
 Asynchrony: A mobile agent does not need a permanent connection to its owner, i.e. 
the device of the owner; it performs its task asynchronously.  
 Intelligence: Interact with, learn from the environment, and make decisions. A most 
advanced agent should be able to decide its action based on its knowledge and the 
information it gets en route, and thus be able to generate new knowledge from its 
experience. 
 Recursion: Create child agents for subtasks if necessary. An important concept is 
agent cloning. The agent can clone itself, that is, create a new mobile agent that is a 
copy of the parent.  
 Collaboration: Cooperate and negotiate with other agents. Complicated tasks can be 
carried out by collaboration of a group of agents. 
4.2.4   Why Are Mobile Agents a Good Idea? 
In this section, we want to describe some major advantages of mobile agents and try to 
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 Reduction in Network Load 
Mobile agents are useful when reducing the flow of raw data in the network. When very 
large volumes of data are stored at remote hosts, that data should be processed in its locality 
rather than transferred over the network. 
 Delegation of Tasks 
 A user can employ a mobile agent as a representative to which the user may delegate 
tasks. Autonomous mobile agents aim at taking care of entire tasks and working without 
permanent contact and control. As a result, the user can devote time and attention to other, 
more important things. 
 Adapt Dynamically 
Mobile agents can examine their execution environment, and adapt dynamically to 
changes. For example, if the host signals shutdown, the agent can pick up and go to another 
host to continue its work. 
 Protocol Encapsulation 
Protocols enable components of a distributed system to communicate and co-ordinate their 
activities. Mobile agents permit new protocols to be installed automatically, and when a 
protocol is upgraded, only the mobile agent has to be altered. 
 Robustness and Fault Tolerance 
The potential of a mobile agent to react dynamically to unfavorable situations makes it 
easier to build robust and fault-tolerant distributed systems. This is because of their mobility. 
 Reduction in Network Latency 
By transferring an agent across the network to the source of data to process it there, the 
communication bandwidth and communication latency can be reduced.  
 Naturally Heterogeneous Property 
Network computing is fundamentally heterogeneous, often from both hardware and 
software perspectives. Mobile agents are preferably implemented in an interpretive language; 
they are independent of platforms and networks. 
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4.3   Mobile Agent Security 
Although the mobile agent technology has many significant benefits to be applied to a 
wide range, it also brings significant new security threats because the mobile code generated 
by a party will be transferred and run in an environment controlled by the other party. Several 
security issues arise in various areas to mobile agent computing, including authentication, 
authorization (or access control), intrusion detection, etc. Malicious agents, platforms and 
third parties could attack a mobile agent system. In addition, mobile agents have 
characteristics such as mobility. Therefore, security issues become more complicated in 
mobile agent systems. This section introduces the concept and structure of mobile agent 
security, discusses various attacks and countermeasures of mobile agent systems [126]. 
4.3.1   Security Threats of Mobile Agent 
Since mobile agents migrate through open and insecure networks and are executed on 
hosts of uncertain trust, security is a major concern. The security threats in mobile agent 
systems can be divided into three categories [64]: threats of malicious agents, threats of 
malicious hosts, and threats during migration, as shown in Figure 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2: Basic Threat Model in Mobile Agent Technologies 
4.3.1.1   Threats of Malicious Agents 
A malicious agent is a potential security threat for the hosts within the network. Such 
agents may attempt to impersonate a legitimate agent in order to gain unauthorized access to a 
particular host. They may eavesdrop the execution host, for example, through a hidden Trojan 




Threats of Malicious Agents  
 Impersonate other agents 
 Unauthorized access 
 Trojan  horses, viral code 
 DoS: overconsume 
 Resources of the host 
     Threats of Malicious Hosts 
 Alter the Agent 
 Violate Privacy of the Agent 
 Manipulate Execution Flow 
 Destroy the Agent 
 
    Threats during Migration 
 Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 
 Loss of Privacy 
 Loss of Integrity  
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Additionally, they may cause denial-of-service attacks on the executing host if proper 
precautions are not taken by consuming the bandwidth or the resources of the host. In 
addition, part of the agent’s execution code may be destructive code, such as viral code [64]. 
We further classify malicious agents according to the target they attack [123, 126]. 
 Attacking the Hosting Agency 
The most obvious example of a malicious agent is one that consumes resources of the 
hosting environment in an improper way. For this reason, the agency eventually is not able to 
provide its usual service to other agents.  Such attacks are therefore called denial-of-service 
attacks. In a less severe case, the agent merely wants to annoy the agency’s administrator by 
opening windows on its screen. In this case, the agent is authorized but does not comply with 
the unwritten rules of a benevolently behaving agent.  
The second type of attack to the hosting agency is when an agent tries to gain unauthorized 
access to the agency.  If it succeeds, not only the privacy and integrity of this agency may be 
detrimentally affected, but also other mobile agents would be attacked from a variety of 
aspects, which in turn will have a negative impact on the entire mobile agent system. 
A malicious mobile agent may also claim itself as another agent on a mobile agent 
platform. Such masquerading action can also be called "faking". The results of masquerading 
include unauthorized access and even damage to platform resources, leaking confidential 
secrets, and ruining the established trust and reputation of the legitimate agent. 
 Attacking Other Agents 
A malicious agent that wants to attack other agents currently residing at the same agency 
has several possibilities.  
First, a malicious agent would gain full control of the referenced agent, could invoke 
methods outside the agent’s own life-cycle model, and could modify accessible object 
variables. Consequently, no agent must have access to any other agent on the programming 
language level. Second, a malicious agent can mask its identity to cheat other agents and gain 
sensitive information from them or to use services on behalf of the betrayed agents without 
paying for them. Third, a malicious agent could initiate denial of service attacks on other 
agents, for example, by sending thousands of spam messages. The attacked agent is not able 
to work properly and the agent owner suffers from these attacks. Finally, an agent rejects the 
result of a communication with another agent. This can be done intentionally or 
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unintentionally. In either case, there will be a quarrel about this, and the agency should 
prevent that by logging all agent activities. 
4.3.1.2   Threats of Malicious Hosts 
Mobile agents are extremely vulnerable to attacks from malicious hosts since the execution 
of the agent relies on the host. Since the host has access to the code, data, and state of an agent 
on execution time, a malicious host may alter, tamper, or manipulate the code, data, and state 
of the agent [64, 123].  
 Attacking Other Agencies 
Attacks against other agencies are directed at the communication link between agencies. 
Using passive attacks, such as eavesdropping, where in which the adversary monitors the 
communication link between two agencies and captures agents to extract useful information 
from the agent’s state or code. This might result in a leakage of sensitive information. 
Another form of attack is traffic analysis. Here, the adversary attempts to find patterns in 
the communication between two agencies, which might allow the adversary to derive certain 
assumptions based on these patterns. Active attacks include security threats in which an 
agency tries to manipulate agent code or data while it is transmitted between agencies. The 
most common examples of this kind of attack are alterations and impersonation. Sometimes 
malicious agencies attack an agent to cause another agency to malfunction. 
 Attacking Agents 
Attacks against agents involve malicious agencies that try to tamper with an agent’s code 
or data. Unfortunately, this type of attack is much more difficult to prevent than malicious 
agent attacks. The general problem is that a mobile agent must disclose its information about 
code and data if it wants to be executed. We distinguish this type of attack with regard to the 
type of information that is targeted. 
 Modify Mobile Agent's Code: The mobile agent's code has to be readable by a guest 
Host. This characteristic makes the attack of leaking out/modifying mobile agent's 
code unavoidable. A malicious Host could read and remember the instruction going to 
be executed and might infer the rest of the program based on that knowledge. Thus, 
the Host could get to know the strategy and purpose of the mobile agent. 
 Modify Mobile Agent's Data: This could be very dangerous too. Since some data are 
security sensitive, such as security keys, electronic cash, or social security numbers, it 
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may cause leak of privacy or loss of money. If a malicious Host knows the physical 
location of data, it may modify the data in accordance with the semantics of data. 
Therefore it can result in very severe consequences. 
 Modify Mobile Agent's Execution Flow: If a malicious Host knows a mobile agent's 
code, data and the physical location of its program counter, it can infer what 
instruction will be executed next. Moreover, it can deduce the state of that mobile 
agent. Then it might change the execution flow according to its will to achieve its 
goal. 
 Denial of Service: A malicious Host can simply not execute the mobile agent 
migrating to it or put the agent into waiting list and thus cause delay to that mobile 
agent. 
 Masquerade: A malicious Host may disguise itself as a Host to which a mobile agent 
will migrate to or even as the home Host when the mobile agent returns. If it succeeds, 
it can get the secrets of the mobile agent by cheating and at the same time hurt the 
reputation of the original Host. 
 Modify the Interaction between a Mobile Agent and other Parties: A malicious host 
may eavesdrop on the interaction between a mobile agent and other parties like 
another agent or another Host. From the information it gets, it may infer some secrets 
about the mobile agent and the third party. 
4.3.1.3   Threats during Migration 
These threats are related to logical attacks on mobile agents during their transmission from 
one host to another, such as man-in-the middle attacks. For this reason, they can be 
considered a special case of malicious host threats. 
In the following sections, we attempt to provide a taxonomy of the solutions proposed in 
the literature in order to help the reader understand the aim of each proposed solution, the 
assumptions it is based on, and the practicality of each particular implementation. 
4.3.2   Security Mechanisms in Mobile Agent 
Security mechanisms are mechanisms designed to prevent, detect or recover from security 
attacks. Several mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to confront security threats 
of mobile agent systems. These are generally divided into two basic categories: host 
protection and agent protection mechanisms. We analyze these two categories. 
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4.3.2.1   Host Protection 
The primary issue in the security of mobile agent systems is to protect host against 
malicious attacks launched by the agents. We now consider the problem of host how can be 
protected against malicious agents. Actually, this problem is played down and regarded as 
almost solved in large parts of the literature. In fact, the problem of malicious agents seems to 
be better understood than the reverse problem of malicious hosts. The main ideas of 
protecting a host from attacks should include the following three aspects. First, a safe 
environment should be provided for execution of any alien program, which includes both 
software-based fault isolation and safe-code interpretation. Second, the safety properties of 
any alien code should be checked before being executed on the platform. Third, the security 
should be ensured through signed code and path histories [126]. 
 Sandboxing 
Sandboxing is a software technique used to protect mobile agent platform (host) from 
malicious mobile agents. In an execution environment (platform), local code is executed with 
full permission and has access to crucial system resources [127]. This technique is includes 
the following elements [123]: 
 Each Java class is loaded from a specific code source that is specified by a URL 
(which is called codebase). If the code is signed, the code source also includes 
information about the signer. 
 A permission is a specific action that a code is allowed to perform. In Java, 
permissions have a type (a class name), a name, and an action. 
 A protection domain is an association of code sources and a set of permissions.  
 Policy files are used to define protection domains. They can be plain text files in 
which you define which permissions a code loaded from some URL will have. 
 Keystores contain certificates that can be used to verify signed code. The agent 
authorization process defines which permissions a mobile agent should have.  
Actually, code is executed in a sort of “sand box”, in a distinct domain, where very few 
things can be damaged. A single identifier associated to each domain checks access to 
memory and other resources. This approach has been adopted for Java applets distribution. 
The problem is that the creation of a “sand box” means setting some limitations to the code, 
restrictions that, to some particular applications, can be too strict [128]. Another problem of 
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this technique is that it increases the execution time of legitimate remote code but this can be 
overcome by combining Code Signing and Sandboxing, as will be explained later [127]. 
 Code Signing 
A fundamental technique to protect the code is to sign it with a digital signature. Digital 
signature is a means ensuring the confirmation of the code’s authenticity, its origin and its 
integrity. Usually who signs the code is the agent’s creator or user; hence, digital signature is 
considered as an indication of the authority under which the agent operates [128]. 
Code signing involves public key cryptography, which relies on a pair of keys associated 
with an entity. One key is kept private by the entity and the other is made publicly available. 
The agent code, signature, and public key certificate can then be forwarded to a recipient, who 
can easily verify the source and authenticity of the code. In fact, the meaning of a signature 
may be different depending on the policy associated with the signature scheme and the party 
who signs [129].  
There are two main drawbacks of the Code Signing approach. Firstly, this technique 
assumes that all the entities on the trusted list are trustworthy and that they are incorruptible. 
Mobile code from such a producer is granted full privileges. If the mobile agent is malicious, 
it can use those privileges not only to directly cause harm to the executing platform but also to 
open a door for other malicious agents by changing the acceptance policy on the platform. 
Moreover, the effects of the malicious agent attack may only occur later, which makes it 
impossible to establish a connection between the attack and the attacker. Such attacks are 
referred to as “delayed attacks”. Secondly, this technique is overly restrictive towards agents 
that are coming from untrustworthy entities, as they do not run at all [127]. The approach that 
combines Code Signing and Sandboxing described in the next alleviates these drawbacks. 
 Code Signing and Sandboxing Combined 
According to [127], Java JDK 1.1 combines the advantages of both Code Signing and 
Sandboxing. If the code consumer trusts the signer of the code, then the code will run as if it 
were local code, that is, with full privileges being granted to it. On the other hand, if the code 
consumer does not trust the signer of the code then the code will run inside a Sandbox as in 
JDK 1.0. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it enables the execution of the mobile code 
produced by untrustworthy entities. However, this method still suffers from the same 
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drawback as Code Signing, that is, malicious code that is deemed trustworthy can cause 
damage and even change the acceptance policy. 
The security policy is the set of rules for granting programs permission to access various 
platform resources. The “black-and-white” policy only allows the platform to label programs 
as completely trusted or untrusted, as the case in JDK 1.1. The combination of Code Signing 
and Sandboxing implemented in JDK 1.2 (Java 2) incorporates fine-grained access control 
and follows a “shades-of-grey” policy. This policy is more flexible than the “black-and-
white” policy, as it allows a user to assign any degree of partial trust to a code, rather than just 
“trusted” and “untrusted”. There is a whole spectrum of privileges that can be granted to the 
code. In JDK 1.2 all code is subjected to the same security policy, regardless of being labelled 
as local or remote. The run-time system partitions code into individual groups called 
protection domains in such a way that all programs inside the same domain are granted the 
same set of permissions. The end-user can authorize certain protection domains to access the 
majority of resources that are available at the executing host while other protection domains 
may be restricted to the Sandbox environment. In between these two, there are different 
subsets of privileges that can be granted to different protection domains, based on whether 
they are local or remote, authorized or not, and even based on the key that is used for the 
signature. Although this scheme is much more flexible than the one in JDK 1.1, it still suffers 
from the same problem, that an end user can grant full privileges to malicious mobile code, 
jeopardizing the security of the executing platform. 
 Safe Code Interpretation 
Agent systems are often developed using an interpreted script or programming language. 
The main motivation for doing this is to support agent platforms on heterogeneous computer 
systems. Moreover, the higher conceptual level of abstraction provided by an interpretative 
environment can facilitate the development of the agent's code [129]. 
The main idea of this security policy is that commands that could be harmful to the 
platform be made safe or refused by an agent. A dangerous command, for example, is that 
which considers the execution of a common string of data as a program’s fragment. The most 
commonly known language security interpreter is probably Safe TCL, used in the first 
development of the Agent TCL system. It is based on the concept of “padded cell”, referring 
just to such access isolation and control technique. After this first interpretation, a second 
“safe” interpreter examines the code, before being executed by TCL interpreter, and points 
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out possible harmful commands to platform. Various safe interpreters can be implemented, to 
create various kinds of approaches [128]. 
 Proof-Carrying Code 
This technique implies that the code’s producer formally proves that the code he wrote is 
safe, i.e. it conforms to the security features previously agreed on with the code’s user and, 
therefore, it can safely be installed and executed [128]. The code consumer publishes a safety 
policy that describes properties that any mobile code has to comply with by using an 
extension of first-order logic, receives the PCC, validates the proof that is part of the PCC, 
and loads the code. This check must be done only once, even if the code is going to be 
executed several times. Afterward, the code can be executed without any additional checking 
[123].  
The PCC involves low-cost static program checking after which the program can be 
executed without any expensive run-time checking. In addition, PCC is considered “tamper-
proof” as any modification done to the code or the proof will be detected. These advantages 
make the Proof Carrying Code technique useful not only for mobile agents but also for other 
applications such as active networks and extensible operating systems [127].  
Nevertheless, some kind of security policy formalism must in fact be established, as well 
as automatic support for proof generation and a technique to limit the several proofs that can 
occur [128]. Experiments showed that it can become even larger than the code that it has to 
prove and, in the worst case, can be exponentially larger than the size of the program [123]. In 
addition, the technique is tied to the hardware and operating environment of the code 
consumer, which may limit its applicability [129]. 
 State Appraisal 
The “State Appraisal” is a technique to ensure that an agent has not become malicious or 
modified because of its state alterations at an untrustworthy platform. A mobile agent is 
roaming with carries the following information: code, static data, collected data, and 
execution state.  
In this technique the author, who creates the mobile agent, produces a state appraisal 
function. This function calculates the maximum set of safe permissions that the agent could 
request from the host platform, depending on the agent’s current state. Similarly, the sender, 
who sends the agent to act on his behalf, produces another state appraisal function that 
determines the set of permissions to be requested by the agent, depending on its current state 
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and on the task to be completed. Subsequently, the sender packages the code with these state 
appraisal functions. If both the author and the sender sign the agent, their appraisal functions 
will be protected against malicious modifications. Upon receipt, the target platform checks 
and verifies the correct state of the incoming agent. Depending on the result of the verification 
process, the platform can determine what privileges should be granted to this incoming agent 
given its current state [127]. 
However, this approach also has some drawbacks. The main problem with this technique is 
that it is not easy to formulate appropriate security properties for the mobile agent and to 
obtain a state appraisal function that guarantees those properties. It is not clear how well the 
theory will hold up in practice, since the state space for an agent could be quite large, and 
while appraisal functions for obvious attacks may be easily formulated, more subtle attacks 
may be significantly harder to foresee and detect [129]. Even in specific application domains, 
the decisive issue is whether it is possible to find suitable appraisal functions that can 
distinguish normal results from deceptive alternatives [123]. 
 Path Histories 
Path History is helpful for the security of mobile agent platforms that a mobile agent 
maintains a record of the platforms it has already visited [126].  
The “Path History” is constructed in the following way. Each visited platform in the 
mobile agent’s travel life adds a signed record to the Path History. This record should contain 
the current platform’s identity together with the identity of the next platform to be visited in 
the mobile agent’s travel path. Moreover, in order to prevent tampering, each platform should 
include the previous record in the message digest that it is signing. After executing the agent, 
the current platform should send the agent together with the complete Path History to the next 
platform. Depending on the information in the Path History, the new platform can decide 
whether to run the agent and what privileges should be granted to the agent [127]. 
 A drawback of this approach is that the size of the path history increases with the number 
of hops, and in the same manner, the time for verification also increases. Some researchers 
believe a major drawback of this approach that each agency already must have a sense of 
trust; in addition, some technique must be available to determine whether it can trust another 
agency. However, path histories as a concept have already influenced some other techniques 
[123]. 
 
 Chapter 4                                                                                                  Mobile Agent Security 
80 
  
4.3.2.2   Agent Protection 
In the previous section, we presented several techniques for protecting mobile agent 
platforms (Protection of Host) against malicious mobile agents. In order to improve the 
security of mobile agents against the attacks that are launched by malicious platforms, many 
security techniques have been suggested. In this section, we explore these techniques. 
 Execution Tracing 
Execution Tracing enables detection of any possible misbehavior by a platform, that is, 
improper modification of the mobile agent code, state, and execution flow. This technique 
assumes that all the involved parties own a public and private key that can be used for digital 
signatures, in order to identify involved parties. Different parties, such as users and platform 
owners, communicate by using signed messages. A platform that receives the agent and 
agrees to execute it produces the associated trace during the agent’s execution. The message 
that an execution platform attaches to the mobile agent typically contains information such as 
the unique identifier of the message, the identity of the sender, the timestamp, the fingerprint 
of the trace, the final state and the trusted third party (which could later be used to resolve 
disputes). Later, the owner of the agent may suspect that certain platform cheated while 
executing the agent. If this is the case, the owner will ask the suspicious platform to reproduce 
the trace. Finally, the agent’s owner validates the execution of the agent by comparing the 
fingerprint of the reproduced trace against the fingerprint of the trace that is originally 
supplied by the suspicious platform. 
Execution Tracing has some limitations, such as the potential large size and number of logs 
to be retained. Another limitation of this technique is that the owner platform needs to wait 
until it obtains suspicious results in order to run the verification process. In addition, this 
technique is considered too difficult to use in the case of multi-threaded agents. 
A new version of the Execution Tracing technique proposed, which modifies the original 
technique by assigning the trace verification process to a trusted third party, the verification 
server, instead of depending on the agent’s owner.  Execution tracing with a verification 
server does not wait until a suspicion is raised in order to run the verification process. The 
verification here is compulsory and this is an advantage over the original Execution Tracing 
technique where the verification process is triggered only by suspicious results. However, 
Execution Tracing with a verification server still suffers from the same limitation as the 
original technique. Additionally, each platform chooses a verification server and that might 
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encourage and facilitate a possible malicious collaboration between a platform and the server 
[127]. 
 Obfuscated Code 
Code obfuscation [130] aims at generating executable agents, which cannot be attacked by 
reading, or manipulating their code i.e., an agent is a black box if its code and data cannot be 
read or modified at any time. This technique is based on transforming the agent code in such a 
way that it is functionally identical to the original one, but it is impossible to understand it. 
There are different useful obfuscating transformations. Layout Obfuscation tries to remove 
or modify some information in the code, such as comments and debugging information, 
without affecting the executable part of the code. Data Obfuscation concentrates on 
obfuscating the data and data structures in the code without modifying the code itself. Control 
Obfuscation tries to alter the control flow in the code without modifying the computing part of 
the code. Preventive Obfuscation concentrates on protecting the code from decompilators and 
debuggers [127].  
In fact, there are many techniques for improving the effectiveness of these approaches. 
However, the major drawbacks of these techniques is that there is no known method or 
algorithm for providing black box protection. Computing with encrypted functions is cited as 
an example, but serious reservations about the limited range of input specifications that apply 
are raised. A time limited black box implies that code or data of an agent cannot be read or 
modified within a known time interval and that after the interval, the attacks do not have 
effects [131]. 
 Co-Operating Agents 
The Co-Operating Agent technique [127] distributes critical tasks of a single mobile agent 
between two co-operating agents. Each of the two cooperating agents executes the tasks in 
one of two disjoint sets of platforms. The co-operating agents share the same data and 
exchange information in a secret way. The Co-Operating Agent technique reduces the 
possibility of the shared data being pilfered by a single host. Each agent records and verifies 
the route of its co-operating agent. When the agent travels from one platform to another, it 
uses an authenticated communication channel to pass information to its co-operating agent.  
However, this technique has some drawbacks. The first one being the complexity of 
defining subgroups of platforms that will not collaborate with each other to attack the 
application. The second drawback is the need to establish a secure authenticated channel 
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between the agent and its co-operators, which may not be possible to provide in all scenarios. 
Besides, this technique undermines the agent’s autonomy, for it requires the agent to interact 
with other agents in order to carry out its tasks [130]. 
 Environmental Key Generation 
The environmental Key Generation describes a scheme for allowing an agent to take 
predefined action when some environmental condition is true [129].  
This can be achieved by sending a mobile agent carrying an encrypted message. The 
encrypted message may include some data and/or executable code. Neither can the mobile 
agent precisely predict its own execution at the receiver platform, nor can the platform foresee 
the incoming agent task. The agent will wait at the receiving platform for some environmental 
condition to occur [127]. 
The basic scenario is as follows: The agent has a cipher-text message and a method to 
search the environment for the data needed to generate the secret key for decryption. When 
the information is found, the agent can generate the key and decipher the message. Without 
this key, the agent has no idea about the content and the semantic of the encrypted message; 
that is, the agent is clueless. 
Therefore, we see, the general idea is to give the agent only hash values of some 
information and let the agent compare this hash value with computed hash values at the 
remote agency. If they match, the hash value is used as a key to decrypt additional 
information or code that should be processed now. 
Thus, the goals of this method are (1) to protect the intention of the agent by not giving it 
full knowledge about its task and (2) to protect further against actions by using encryption. It 
is obvious that the hosting agency can still attack the agent after it has decrypted the message, 
but to do this, it must be executed. An analysis a priori, for example, by a dictionary attack, is 
very costly [123]. 
In fact, this technique has some limitations. The receiving platform could act maliciously 
against the incoming agent. When the environmental condition is met and the activation key is 
generated, the platform could modify the agent to perform a different function, for example, 
to print out the executable code instead of running it [127] (i.e., this technique is that it 
protects data and code but does not protect the behavior of agent.). Another problem with this 
technique is that decrypting pieces of code at runtime implies that it must be allowed to create 
 Chapter 4                                                                                                  Mobile Agent Security 
83 
  
code dynamically, which might be prohibited by the hosting agency and/or the underlying 
execution environment [123]. 
 Partial Result Encapsulation 
Partial Result Encapsulation (PRE) is a detection technique tampering by malicious hosts 
that aims to discover any possible security breaches on an agent during its execution at 
different platforms. PRE is used to encapsulate the results of an agent’s action, at each 
platform visited for subsequent verification. The verification can be done either when the 
agent returns to the point of origin or at intermediate points [131]. 
The PRE technique has different implementations. In certain scenarios, the encapsulation 
can be done by the agent, platform or by a trusted third party.  To meet certain security 
requirements such as integrity, accountability, and privacy of the agent, PRE makes use of 
different cryptographic primitives, such as encryption, digital signatures, authentication codes, 
and hash functions [127]. 
Another method for an agent to encapsulate result information is to use Partial Result 
Authentication Codes (PRAC), which are cryptographic checksums formed using secret key 
cryptography (i.e., message authentication codes). This technique requires the agent and its 
originator to maintain or incrementally generate a list of secret keys used in the PRAC 
computation [129].  
The PRAC technique has a number of limitations [129]. The most serious occurs when a 
malicious platform retains copies of the original keys or key generating functions of an agent. 
If the agent revisits the platform or visits another platform conspiring with it, a previous 
partial result entry or series of entries could be modified without the possibility of detection. 
Since the PRAC is oriented towards integrity and not confidentiality, the accumulated set of 
partial results can also be viewed by any platform visited, although applying sliding key or 
other forms of encryption easily resolve this. 
Some researchers devised a platform-oriented technique for encapsulating partial results, 
which reformulated and improved on the PRAC technique. A variant of this technique, which 
uses message authentication codes in lieu of digital signatures, is also described. 
 Computing with Encrypted Functions 
This technique represents a software solution for protecting a mobile agent from a 
malicious executing platform during its itinerary. This is a cryptographic solution to achieve 
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integrity and privacy of the mobile agent. Achieving privacy means that the mobile agent can 
conceal its program (code) when it is executed remotely in an untrusted environment [127]. 
Supposing that a mobile agent has to execute a certain function f, then f is encrypted to obtain 
E(f), and a program is created that implements E(f). Platforms execute E(f) on a cleartext input 
value x, without knowing what function they actually computed. The execution yields E(f(x)), 
and this value can only be decrypted by the agent owner to obtain the desired result f(x) [130]. 
Although the idea is straightforward, the trick is to find appropriate encryption schemes 
that can transform arbitrary functions as intended [129]. In addition, this technique protects 
the mobile agent’s integrity and privacy [127], however, does not prevent denial of service, 
replay, experimental extraction, and other forms of attack against the agent. 
 Detection of Denial of Services 
This method in order to enable detection of any Denial of Services’ attack (DoS) on the 
agent. DoS attack includes preventing the agent from accomplishing its task, preventing the 
agent from migrating to its next destination, and destroying the agent. The method is based on 
the usage of undeniable proofs, e.g, digital signature. When agent’s owner suspects that the 
agent suffered from DoS attack, e.g. the agent did not return back after a certain threshold 
period of waiting time. The owner then asks all visited platforms in agent’s itinerary to 
introduce the undeniable proof in order to judge that the visited platform did not launch DoS 
attack against the agent and correctly dispatch the agent [127]. 
4.4   Approaches based Mobile Agent Security for Ad Hoc 
Networks 
The different security mechanisms have been invented to counter malicious attacks. A first 
line of defense includes encryption, access control, authentication, and digital signature. As a 
second line of defense, intrusion detection systems and cooperation enforcement mechanisms 
implemented in MANET can also help to defend against attacks or enforce cooperation, 
reduction of selfish node behavior. 
In this section, we will briefly explain some study to achieve security in ad hoc networks, 
which based mobile agent paradigm that is a new solution and it has important advantages 
such as, distribution of management code, robustness, dynamically changing network 
policies, data collection, re-activeness, decentralization, network monitoring, and so on. 
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The several directions of progressing research in ad hoc networks are based on security 
challenges that cover various classes of security attacks and how ad hoc network can defend 
against those attacks. Various other approaches are proposed in the last few years based on 
existing mechanism. One of this mechanism discussed in [132], where the network is splitted 
into a power two number grid clusters, respecting to the available battery level. A node in the 
cluster is elected to be the cluster head and the rest nodes become cluster members. In each 
cluster there is a dedicated mobile agent consist of four modules: Registration Module (RM), 
Service Agreement (SA), Detection Module (DM) and Prevention Module (PM). 
     All the node in the cluster including the cluster head have to be register with mobile 
agent, and the MA store the list of all cluster nodes in the RM. The Detection Module of the 
mobile agent analyse the packets exchanged between nodes, if any mismatch is found, the 
MA informs the CH to drop the packet and to block the node. The communication inter-
cluster is possible with the same supervision of the MA, but the packets have to be transmitted 
from CH to the other CH. 
     A new approach called securing DSR with mobile agents in wireless ad hoc networks 
proposed in [133]. The authors try to secure Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol of an 
ad hoc network by using mobile agents. There are three types of mobile agents used in this 
routing protocol: discovery/reply of mobile agent, maintenance of mobile agent, 
update/approve for symmetric key mobile agent. Hybrid encryption technique (symmetric key 
encryption/public key encryption) is used to improve performance; where symmetric keys are 
used to encrypt routing data to authenticate and authorize node-sending data, while, public 
keys are used for the exchange of symmetric keys between nodes. 
     The distributed trust based framework presented in [134] to protect the agents and the 
host platforms against threats of the environment like the kill of the agents while visiting 
some hosts, the authors propose a threat model, where they assume that any node in the 
network can be malicious node, which kill or misrouting the arrived agent. Due to the nature 
of MANET, nodes can only have an opinion about its neighbours, this opinion in defined as 
the degree of trust between nodes. The authors define a model of trust as a reputation system, 
where they defined three concepts: belief (how much trustworthy a host is) or disbelief (how 
much suspected a host is) as well as uncertainty, this expressed mathematically as: b + d + 
u=1. Here b, d, u designate belief, disbelief and uncertainty respectively. They claimed that 
nodes could detect all the malicious nodes and eventually prevent themselves and their agents 
from network hostilities.  
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     Another work proposed new approach in [135], where mobile agents collect 
information about the nodes of a cluster by visiting them one by one, until it returns to the 
cluster head. The cluster head to process of key deactivation, common leader election, use this 
information and key serving nodes selection one-way hash function protects the code of the 
mobile agent against any malicious modification. A secret key of cluster nodes is generated 
based on a distributed private key generation scheme, used for validate the identity of the 
cluster head and cluster’s members. The paper presents the behaviour of the proposed 
protocol against several scenarios like: Masquerading, Eavesdropping, Unauthorized access 
and alteration, and Denial of service. The simulation of the proposed protocol is carried on 
using the ns-2 simulator because it is very used in such problems. The authors claim that the 
proposed schema is effective and provides a high packet delivery ratio and low delay 
compared to the cluster based routing protocol CBRP 
     The authors of [136] define a new composite key management technique for key 
management in ad hoc network. A network is partitioned into clusters based on the dominator 
concept, in each cluster a node considered the most trusted and active is elected as a cluster 
head. A fuzzy logic controller calculates the degree of trust of nodes, which represent the 
degree of belief about the future behavior of other entities. In addition to the public key, each 
node has also a private key generate by a specific cluster called the Primary Key Generation, 
which are a number of cluster head with high value of trust. 
     Agent based trusted on-demand routing protocol for mobile ad-hoc networks is 
presented in [137], authors propose a protocol called ATDSR. It selects the most trusted as 
well as the minimum hop count route from different possible routes with minimal overhead in 
terms of extra messages and time delay. This protocol uses a Multi-Agent System (MAS) that 
consists of two types of agents that cooperate with each other to achieve the required task; 
specifically Monitoring Agent (MoA) and Routing Agent (RoA). MoA is responsible for 
monitoring its hosting node behavior in the routing process and then computing the trust value 
for this node. RoA is responsible for using the trust information and finding out the trust 
worthiest route for a particular destination. 
The authors proposed a clustering protocol and trusted model for enhancing the security in 
the network [138], the clustering protocol organizes the network into one-hop disjoint clusters 
and elects the most qualified, trustworthy node as a cluster head. Each node computes its trust 
level using self and recommendation evidences of its one-hop neighbors. 
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Another work proposed new approach in [139]; the main idea of this approach is based on 
dummy agent. It is proposes a secured mechanism to manage the security of the mobile agent 
for MANET. Before transferring the mobile agent to a node, a source station it sends a 
dummy agent to check if the node is malicious or not. in case the node is intrusion, the source 
station transfer another agent called supervisor for it inform about the intrusions or kills the 
mobile agents at wireless node before intruder infects to it. 
Among the works that Addressed a security of ad hoc network mentioned in [140]. This 
approach based on the key management, where benefit from the advantages of mobile agents 
to use them in the process of exchanging of private key and network topology between the 
nodes. A mobile agent travels from node to another according to least-visited-neighbor-first 
algorithm, when a new node wants to join the network, it created a new mobile agent carrying 
the public and the secret key, and a set of nodes will cooperate with each other to authenticate 
the new one using their mobile agents. 
This approach [141] incorporates agents and data mining techniques to prevent anomaly 
intrusion in mobile ad hoc networks. Home agent is present in each system and it collects the 
data about its system from application layer to routing layer. This approach provides security 
solution to current node, neighboring node, and global networks, where it monitors its own 
system and its environment dynamically, it uses classifier construction to find out the local 
anomaly and it provides the same type of solution throughout the global networks. 
The author in [142] develops an Intrusion Detection System as a combination of the rule 
based and the behaviour based scheme; to defend the security of the network against the 
major security attacks. This IDS works as two phases system: A), Initialization Set up and 
Learning Phase. A collector agent collect a raw data from the network to be stored in the 
primary database, this data are filtered and processed then organized as atomic events used for 
treating simple network attacks, the events can be combined to create complex attack rules 
stored in the attack library. In other side, monitor agents are deployed on the network 
according to the clustered node selection algorithm. B) Agent Deployment and Intrusion 
Detection: in this phases a set of agents are initialized and organized as an hierarchical 
system, this system represents the proposed IDS in this paper, the main type of agents used in 
it are: Network Monitoring Agents: exist in few nodes of the cluster, their role is to collect the 
information necessary for IDS function. Host Monitoring Agents: a host-monitoring agent 
monitors each node. Decision Making Agents: it is role is to make decision for each node 
based on individual threshold threat level assigned. It can cooperate with the learning module 
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to make critical decisions. Database Agents: database agents are of three types: the primary 
database used in phase “A” for learning; the host information database and the network 
information database to store information about the host and the network respectively.  
Communication Agents: this agent is part of the host and network IDS, its role is to read 
information from any arrived agent and if any new attack is found it will be added to the 
attack database by the database agent. Alert Agents: is used to notify the learning module by 
any node whenever a new attack is found. 
The Ant Colony Optimization (ACO) is a swarm intelligence used in the paper [143] for 
developing a real time routing protocol, where the (ACO) is used as Identification Agent and 
Target Agent. In the initialization of network phase, ACO flooded in the network as 
Identification Agent to identify all authenticated members in order to process handshake. 
When an authenticated node of a group receives the message from unknown node, it initiates 
the mobile agent to collect security information of the unknown node. The Message Digest 5 
hash function h=H (M) generates hash value, which is used to create message digest 
authenticated node. The authenticated node generates the digital signature (dsign = (H (M))
d 
mod n ). If the unknown node is an authenticated node of the group, if the generated H (M) by 
the receiver and the decrypted H (M) of digital signature dsign is equal, then the receiver 
accepts the data; otherwise rejects the data and informs the sender that the data is altered 
through by generating route error packet. This process is repeated in every hop of the noded is 
joint path between source and destination. 
The authors of this paper [144] propose a new IDS architecture for MANET based on 
system multi agent, for protecting this type of networks against intrusions and attacks. The 
network in this proposition is structured as a set of clusters, inside it there are five types of 
agents consist the multi agent detection system, these agents are: Sensor Agent (SA): it 
captures network raw traffic and formats in a predefined format, then send it to the Agent 
Analyser (AnA). Manager Agent: The manager agent can ask other agents for local 
information related to suspicious activity, in this case one or more agents analyser located in 
different nodes in cluster can provide local information to the initiator. Ontology Agent (OA): 
for treating unknown attacks. Agent actuator (ACA): for treating known attacks. Agent 
Analyser (AnA): The agent analyser analyse the formatted data and compare the analysis 
result by applies rules of detection recorded in his database.  
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4.4.1   Discussion 
In general, these approaches presented above on the security of ad hoc networks based 
mobile agent are certainly interesting, but it is suffered from one or more of the following 
limitations: 
 There is no generalized framework that can be adapted to different types of network 
and application, i.e. although these approaches have been able to respond to a set of 
security requirements, they remain effective only in a specific context related to the 
assumptions and restrictive requirements that were issued during the design. 
 These approaches does not interest on the different concerns of security in a system 
based on mobile agents. Indeed, the majority of approaches interested in specifying 
security policies to control the behavior of mobile agents and their access to resources. 
 Most of these security schemes either provide protection to agents from agents/host or 
host from agent/external parties but not both. 
 Most of these works are still only at the theoretical level, have not been implemented 
on the reality, and do not provide flexibility to users for specifying their desired 
security policies under a given attack scenario. 
 In fact, there is not universal solution to the problem of malicious host. Only partial 
solutions have been proposed. In addition, most of these security mechanisms aimed 
detection rather than preventing attacks from malicious hosts. 
 Finally, we noticed also that the majority of these works limit the representation of the 
mobile agent to a simple object or process. Such representation is devoid of all 
necessary concepts to express autonomy, intelligence, and the cognitive aspect of the 
agent (such as beliefs, knowledge and skills).  
4.5   Conclusion 
In this chapter, we gave overview of mobile agent, such as, definition, structure, propriety 
and why the mobile agent use or benefit of the mobile agent. We also described the security 
threats of mobile agent, security mechanisms in mobile agent, such as, Sandboxing, Code 
Signing, State Appraisal, Execution tracing, Obfuscated Code, Environmental Key 
Generation,.....etc. 
In fact, the problem of malicious hosts attacking an agent is by far the most difficult to 
solve. Although achieving a complete solution is considered impossible, mechanisms have 
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been presented that mitigate several problems. However, the security mechanisms used in 
existing mobile agent systems are usually hard to be generalized and implemented. In 
addition, most existing mobile agent systems do not have formal methods as their bases. 
Therefore, it is not easy to analyze their features, and verify their security properties and 
consistency. It is still an open research question: Which of all these mechanisms can be 
combined to later form some kind of general security solution?.                                                .                                                                                                                                                                            













   
No one can build his security upon  
                                                                                                                       the nobleness of another person.  
    
   Willa Cather 
 
We present in this chapter our novel and effective model that we have devised and titled 
“Security Model based on Mobile Agent for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”. Our model relies on 
the concept of dominating set based clustering for partitioning network into clusters and 
mobile agent. The cluster head elected based on both the trust and resources ability of the 
node.  
In the first contribution, we define three agent types. The Node Agent (NA) manages the 
use of node resources. The Monitor Agent (MoA) that is responsible for all operations within 
the cluster and outside with counterparts. The Monitor Agent creates the Inspector Agent 
(IA), which travails from node to another to examine the actions history of each node agent to 
detect any suspect behaviour, and returns to MoA with report shows the status of each node 
in the cluster. In the second contribution, we proposed four types of agents. Node Agent (NA), 
Monitor Agent (MA), Ambassador Agent (AmA), and Transporter Agent (TA). The Monitor 
Agent creates the Ambassador Agents and sending to all nodes in the cluster. The 
Ambassador Agent is like local IDS and IPS (Intrusion Detection System and Intrusion 
Prevention System) at the node. The third contribution is considered a hybrid approach for 
the two preceding. The Monitor Agent created in the most trusted with best resources node to 
control the communication inside and outside the cluster. We gave the architecture interne of 
mobile agent, class diagrams, and communication protocol. 
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5.1   Introduction 
The concept of ad hoc networks is very promising as a new mode of telecommunication to 
complement and extend the existing communication systems. Ad hoc networks consist of 
terminals are generally small sizes, where resource constraints in terms of memory, batteries 
and can move randomly and at any speed (no existing infrastructure or centralized 
administration). These networks evolve in increasingly dynamic environments, unpredictable 
and hostile and therefore generate an important security issue whose resolution is a big 
challenge. This challenge explained by the importance of the use of mobile agents in 
distributed applications to take full advantage of the benefits of their strengths. 
In fact, we discussed in the previous chapter why we used the mobile agent paradigm to 
achieve the expected security services. Studies previously conducted, which focused on the 
importance of the use of mobile agents to solve the problem of security in ad hoc networks 
explained that the benefits of the approach to mobile agent protection for their robustness, 
easy maintenance, and low cost. However, these solutions a lack of global protection solution 
to all security concerns. 
In this chapter, we propose a security model for mobile ad hoc networks based mobile 
agent, where the network is consisting of a set of nodes, each node has node agent for 
resources estimation of the node and communicate with others agents. The network is divided 
into a set of clusters; each cluster must elect a node to be the head cluster (Monitor Agent). 
This monitor agent controls the communication inside cluster by collecting and analysing the 
data from the others nodes, it creates mobile agents to perform certain tasks. 
In the following, we present the network organization, the internal architecture of the Node 
Agent, Inspector Agent, Ambassador Agent, Monitor Agent, and Manager Agent. In addition, 
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5.2   The Proposed Model (Contribution 1) 
     In fact, we divide the network into clusters where each cluster has a dominator. The 
construction of clusters are a distributed manner, a self-organisable, and under the proposed 
conditions. There are three kind of agents: Node Agent, Monitor Agent, and Inspector Agent. 
5.2.1   Organization of the Network 
     In our model, the security is carried out in three levels (Node Level, Cluster Level, and 
Network Level) by a set of agents, which communicate with each other a secure manner. 
5.2.1.1   Node Level 
     The node agent is installed in each node to estimate available resources to better manage 
the resources of the node (battery, degree node, CPU and memory,) in order to satisfy 
application security requirements. We take into account the parameters TL, EL, DN, CL, and 
ML, to calculate the full capacity Cni of the terminal, whereas: 
 
Cni = f (TL, EL, DN, CL, ML) 
Knowing that: 
TL: Trust Level 
EL: Energy Level 
DN: Degree Node (i.e. the highest number of neighbors) 
CL: CPU Load 
ML: Memory Load 
To simplify our Model, we assume that these parameters are independent and we introduce 
the following equation to measure the capacity of a node: 
  
Cni = aTL + bEL + cDN + dCL + eML 
 
Where:  
                 a, b, c, d, e : are the security management parameters to favor a resource or a 
terminal compared to the other depending on the role of the agent will play or the proposed 
conditions, while: a + b + c + d + e =1. 
5.2.1.2   Cluster Level 
     This level describes the interactions between nodes within the same group to manage 
local of various security features. Here the node takes the state: Member or Cluster Head. 
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5.2.1.3   Network Level 
     A network organizes as a set of clusters; each cluster is a set of nodes. We proposed a 
mechanism of mobile agent to manage security interactions between different clusters. The 
following figure illustrates the general architecture of our Model. 
  
Fig 5.1: Our proposed architecture for security Model based Mobile Agent in 
MANETs 
5.2.2   Algorithm to Construct Clusters 
Several algorithms have been proposed in the literature for the construction and 
maintenance of groups. We will try to offer an algorithm to construct clusters according to the 
optimization function that we present before. 
 Each node agent calculates the capacity of node (Cni), create a message containing its 
routing table and send it to all adjacent nodes agents. 
 After the authentication process, the exchange of information, groups of nodes agents 





Communication inside the cluster 
Communication outside the cluster 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Cluster 3 Cluster N 
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 Each group is a limited number of node agent, the node agent has the great ability 
elected as Monitor Agent, while others consider Members. 
 In the initial state, we will give to a limited number of nodes a value fully trusted of 
the trust level, and the Monitor Agent after the election become a little movement. 
 Each member agent can leave its group and enter another group after the approval of 
the Monitor Agent. 
5.2.3   Modeling of the Trust Level 
     The aggregation of mistake and malicious behavior generated by the node is an 
important element in the elaboration of a final decision as estimating the trust that can grant 
to an entity (node). Let P = {p1, p2,….., pi,….,pn} the set of parameters involved in the 
evaluation of the trust. For example, a message/agent dropped, a message altered, a 
message delayed, a message repeated, and wrong password, etc. Let Wi is represent the 
weight assigned to the parameter Pi. The introduction of a weighting of different 
parameters to aggregate proposed. The Trust (T) formula is as follows: 
 





     Where: |𝑃𝑖| is the number of occurrence of the error Pi. The following algorithm shows 










    
Algorithm 1: Determine the Level of Trust 
     The definition of the trust parameters and weightings made by the network 
administrator. These two operations very linked to the service security criteria. If the ratio 
between the number of success operations and the number of all operations is greater than a 
Function getleveloftrust (int T) 
{If 80 ≤ T ≤ 100 then 
  Trust_Level: = ‘Fully Trusted’ 
Else If 60 ≤ T < 80 then 
  Trust_Level: = ‘Normal’ 
Else If 40 ≤ T < 60 then 
  Trust_Level: = ‘Average’ 
Else If 20 ≤ T < 40 then 
  Trust_Level: = ‘Low’ 
Else If T < 20 then 
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defined threshold, we update the value of trust level by adding the average of weights 
assigned to mistakes and malicious behaviors. Therefore, the Trust Level will increase as 
follows: 




5.2.4   Architecture of the Mobile Agent 
     In our Model, there are three agents: Node Agent (NA), Inspector Agent (IA), and Monitor 
Agent (MoA). We present in the following the internal architecture of these agents. This 
architecture based on components where every component implements some functions of the 
agent. 
5.2.4.1   Architecture of Node Agent 
The node agent is installed in each node, it maintains routing table that represented by 





Table 5.1: Structure of the Routing Table 
 
Knowing that: 
Neighbor_ID: Is an identifier of a neighbor, we use the IP address of a node to identify it. 
Cluster_ID: Is an identifier of a cluster, we use the IP address and the name of a cluster 
head. 
State: This field designs the state of a node agent it may be a member or a cluster head. 
Cni: Represents the capacity of the node that calculated by the node agent. 
Threshold: Represents the degree of capacity, if the capacity of a terminal reaches a 
constant value, it is necessary to inform others to reduce their load, or can be removed or 
replaced.  
The figure 5.2 shows the architecture of the node agent, the main components that allow 
the agent implementation are the following: 
Security component: This component has a function is to ensure the security agent against all 
malicious access, protect all information that is sent to other agents by well-defined 
mechanisms as symmetric and asymmetric key, etc. 
Neighbor_ID Cluster_ID State Cni Threshold 
@ IP_N @ IP_C M/H % % 
 Chapter 5                                    Security Model based on Mobile Agent for Ad Hoc Networks                                                      
97 
  
Reception component: The reception's role is to receive information from other agents for 














Fig 5.2: Architecture of Node Agent 
Evaluation component: An agent is evaluate the resources of the node according to the 
optimization function that previously presented and proposed conditions. 
Transmission: The transmission’s role is to send message to other agents. 
Decision component: It allows the agent to select the action to perform. 
5.2.4.2   Architecture of Monitor Agent 
The monitor agent is created in the node that called cluster head. This agent is the most 
important among other agents, where it is responsible for all operations within the cluster and 
outside with counterparts. The monitor agent maintains a table of confidence it contains the 
necessary information for the trustworthiness and authentication of each node in the cluster. 








Table 5.2: Structure of the Confidence Table 
 
 
Node ID Trust Level  Public Key 
1    
2    
..    
..    







E   N   V   I   R   O   N   M   E   N   T 
Security Security 
Evaluation (Cni) Reception 




ID: Is an identifier of a node, where each node has a unique identifier. 
Trust Level: This field takes the following properties (Not Trusted, Low, Average, Normal, 
and Fully Trusted). 
Public Key: A key generated by Monitor Agent. 
     The same status in the architecture of node agent, which based on components for 
simplicity, adaptability, evolution, and code reuse, etc., where every component implements 
some functions of the agent. The architecture of Monitor Agent is as follows: 
Collection component: A collection component collects activity information (for instance, the 
process of sending and receiving agents, messages, agent log files, etc.), either from its node 
or from other agents. Those data are gives as an input analyzer component. 
Analyzer component: An analyzer implement a verification policy, which is a set of rules 
defined for a set of events related to the node system or/and agent system (e.g. changes in the 














Fig 5.3: Architecture of Monitor Agent 
Detection component: Their goal is a classification and detection. It uses results provided by 
analyzer component to detect the type of intrusions. It includes both a misuse detection, an 
anomaly detection, and specification detection. The procedure of a misuse detection used to 
determine the exact types of attacks. An anomaly detection procedure used to detect new or 
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unknown attacks. Specification detection is a procedure where we defined a set of constraints 
that describe the correct operation of our Model. The execution of the Model should respect 
the defined constraints. 
 
Estimation component: This component evaluates the trust level of a node by the formula 
that is already proposed. Therefore, the agent takes a decision (e.g.it will elect as cluster 
head, exclusion of the cluster and the network, or attempt to repair if it is possible). 
5.2.4.3   Architecture of Inspector Agent 
The Inspector Agent (IA) is created periodically by the Monitor Agent, it roles is to inspect 
each node locally and send the results to the monitor agent. Therefore, it travails from node to 















Fig 5.4: Architecture of Inspector Agent 
If the node agent is not trusted, the inspector agent can compare its history action with the 
history actions of its communication partners. The life cycle of an Inspector agent initialized 
to be active, waiting, suspended, move, and dispose.  
5.2.5   Class Diagrams of Model 
Here we show the class diagram of our Model, which contains a Node Agent, an Inspector 
Agent, and a Monitor Agent. 
 
























Fig 5.5: Class Diagrams of our Model 
5.2.6   Communication Protocol 
     When a source node wants to send a message to the destination node, it creates a 
message contains information about source and destination node, table 3 shows the whole 







Table 5.3: Structure of the Message 
Knowing that: 
ID_SN: Is the unique identifier of the Source Node. 
ID_DN: Is the unique identifier of the Destination Node. 
Data: Is the continent of the message. 
Hash: Hash value is useful for verifying the integrity of data sent through the nodes of 
network. The hash value of sent data of the source node must be compared between the hash 
value of received data of the destination node to determine whether the data was altered. In 
our Model, we used Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1). 
After the formation of the clusters, the node agent of cluster head change its state to 
Monitor Agent of the cluster. The Monitor Agent creates the inspector agent(s) and sending in 
different times to all nodes in the cluster. The role of inspector agent is to move from node to 
another, in each node it collects, analyses, and inspects the behavior of node agent to detect 
any malicious actions. In other words, the inspector agent works like an IDS at the node level. 
Node ID_SN ID_DN Data Hash 
1     
2     
..     
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When a source node A wants to send data to a destination node B. There are two cases, the 
first one, where node A and B are in the same cluster. The process of sequence diagram 
shown in Fig 6: Sequence Diagram (a). 
1. Node Agent A (NAA) requests from its Monitor Agent, is the node B trust? 
2. Monitor Agent (MoA) sends the trust level of the node B to the Node Agent A, if the 
trust level of the node B is greater than ‘Not Trusted’. 
3. NAA encrypted a Message, if the node B is neighbor of node A, we use low technic of 
encryption ( ), if the node B is not neighbor of A but in the same cluster, we use 



















Fig 5.6: Sequence Diagram (a) 
 
4. NAA sends the message to Node Agent B (NAB). 
5. NAB accepts the message, calculates the Hash to verify the integrity of the message. 
6. If the hash is equal then, it is sends to the (NAA) ACK OK. Otherwise, it sends ACK 
not OK and alert message to Monitor Agent.  
7. MoA sends Inspector Agent (IA) suddenly to all nodes of cluster in different times to 
detect any suspect behaviour. In case MoA receives an alert message, it sends IA 
directly. 
     The second case (b), the source node A and destination node D are in different cluster. The 
process of sequence diagram shown in Fig 7: Sequence Diagram (b) 
1. The NAA requests from the Monitor Agent of cluster which continent the node A, is 







Is the node B trust? 
The Trust Level is ( ) 
Encrypted a Message  
Send the Message  
Cal_ Hash,  
and it's compared   
  
Send ACK OK  
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2. The MoA of the node A searches on the node D in its Confidence Table (CT) and 
didn't find it. As a result, it sends a request to all its counterparts, the MoA of node D 
response it and sends to it the trust level of the node D, if it is greater than ‘Not 
Trusted’, which resends the response to MoA of the node A. 
3. The NAA encrypts message, it sends to its MoA, while the MoA of the node A 
resends this message to MoA of the node D.  
4. The Node Agent D (NAD) accepts the message, calculates the Hash to verify the 
integrity of the message.  
5. If the hash is equal then, it is sends to the MoA of the node D ACK OK; the MoA of 
the node D resends it to Mo A of the node A until it reaches the NAA. Otherwise, it 
sends ACK not OK and alert message to its Monitor Agent, which resends this 














Fig 5.7: Sequence Diagram (b) 
5.3   Another Proposition (Contribution 2) 
Another proposal will be presented in this section. This proposal is similar to the previous 
contribution with the changes in the concept of Multi Agent System. The organization of the 
network is itself like the previous with formulas that calculate the node capability, as well as 
trust. Here, we have four agents: Node Agent (NA), Monitor Agent (MoA), Ambassador 









Is the node D trust? 
Search in its CT Is the node D trust? 
The Trust Level is ( ) The Trust Level is ( ) 
Encrypted a Message  
Send the Message  Send the Message  Send the Message  
Cal_ Hash, and it's  
    compared   
  
Send ACK OK  Send ACK OK  Send ACK OK  
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After the formation of the clusters, the node agent of cluster head change its state to 
Monitor Agent of the cluster. The Monitor Agent creates the Ambassador Agents and sending 
to all nodes in the cluster. The AmA has almost the same degree of MoA but at the node level, 
i.e. the Ambassador Agent is like local IDS and IPS (intrusion detection system and Intrusion 
Prevention System) at the node. Figure 5.8 shows the general architecture of our proposal 
(Contribution 2). 
Fig 5.8: Our Proposed Architecture for Security Model based Mobile Agent in MANETs 
(Contribution 2) 
When Node Agent wants to send information to another node, it creates a Transporter 
Agent (TA) and send it with encrypted information. The agent analyze its data to take a 
decision. The life cycle of a TA initialized to be active, waiting, suspended, move, and 






Communication inside the cluster 
Communication outside the cluster 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Cluster 3 Cluster N 
Transporter Agent 
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5.3.1   Communication Protocol (Contribution 2) 
When a source node B wants to send data to a destination node D. There are three cases, 
the first one, where node B and D are neighbors in the same cluster. To facilitate of 
explanation, we will neglect the contact between ambassador agent and node agent. The 
process of sequence diagram shown in Fig 5.9: Sequence Diagram (c). 
1. Ambassador Agent B (AmAB) request from the Ambassador Agent D (AmAD), is the 
node D trust? 
2. Ambassador Agent D (AmAD) sends the trust level of the node D to the Ambassador 
Agent B (AmAB) if the trust level of the node D is greater than ‘Not Trusted’. 
3. Ambassador Agent B (AmAB) gives the permission to the Node Agent B (NAB) for 
sends its data. 
4. Node Agent B (NAB) creates Transporter Agent B (TAB) attaches by a Message 
Signature (MS) [ID_node B, ID_node D, ID_Transporter Agent B (TAB), and Hash] 









Figure 5.9: Sequence Diagram (c) 
5. Ambassador Agent D (AmAD) accepted the Transporter Agent B (TAB), calculated 
the hash that arrived by it and compares, if the hash is equal then, it is gives to the 
(TAB) ACK OK, and the (TAB) is returns to node B. Otherwise, it will reject the 
(TAB) and sends alert message to its control agent. 
The second case (d), the source node B and destination node D are not neighbors, but at the 
same cluster, the process of sequence diagram was shown in Fig 5.10: Sequence Diagram (d). 
1. The (AmAB) request from its Monitor Agent (MoA), is the node D trust? 
2. The Monitor Agent (MoA) sends the trust level of the node D to the (AmAB) if the 
trust level of the node D is greater than ‘Not Trusted’. 
AmAB AmAD 
Is the node D trust? 
The Trust Level is ( ) 
AmAB sends TAB with MS 
 
Cal_ Hash, and it's compared   
 
Send TAB with ACK OK 
 















Figure 5.10: Sequence Diagram (d) 
3. Ambassador Agent B (AmAB) sends to its Monitor Agent (MoA) a Message 
Signature (MS) [ID_node B, ID_node D, ID_Transporter Agent B (TAB), and Hash]. 
4. The (AmAB) sends its Transporter Agent B (TAB) towards node D. 
5. The (AmAD) request from its MoA, is the node B trust?, and is there a (MS) from it? 
6. The Monitor Agent of the node D sends the trust level of node B and the hash to the 
(AmAD). 
7. The (AmAD) accepted the (TAB), calculated the hash, which arrived by it and 
compares, if the hash is equal then, it is gives to the (TAB) ACK OK, and the (TAB) 
is returns to node B. Otherwise, it will reject the (TAB) and sends alert message to its 
MoA. 
The third case (f), the source node B into cluster while the destination node D into another 
cluster, the process of sequence diagram was shown in Fig 5.11: Sequence Diagram (f). 
1. The (AmAB) request from its MoA, is the node D trust? 
2. The Monitor Agent of the node B searches on the node D in its Confidence Table 
(CT), it did not find. 
3.  The Monitor Agent of the node B sends a request to all its counterparts, a Monitor 
Agent of the node D response it and sends to it the trust level of the node D, if it is 
greater than ‘Not Trusted’, which resends the response to (AmAB). 
4. The (AmAB) sends to its MoA a (MS), while the MoA resends a MS to MoA of the 
node D.  
 
     Cal_ Hash,  
    and it's compared   
   AmAB sends TAB       towards AmAD 
The Trust Level is ( ) 
And the Hash is ( ) 
AmAB sends a MS 
Is the node B trust? 
Is there a MS from it? 
 
The Trust Level is ( ) 
Is the node D trust? 
AmAB AmAD MoA 
      Send TAB       with ACK OK 
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5. The (AmAB) sends its TAB towards AmAD attaches by a (MS). 
6. The (AmAD) request from its MoA, is the node B trust? and is there a (MS) from it?. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Sequence Diagram (f) 
7. The MoA of the node D sends the trust level of node B and the hash value to AmAD. 
8. The (AmAD) accepted the (TAB), calculated the hash, which arrived by it and 
compares, if the hash is equal then, it is gives to the (TAB) ACK OK, and the (TAB) 
is returns to node B. Otherwise, it will reject the (TAB) and sends alert message to its 
MoA. 
5.4   Another Proposition (Contribution 3) 
Another proposal will be presented in this section. This proposal is considered as a hybrid 
approach between the two previous (contribution 1 and 2). The organization of the network is 
itself like the previous with formulas that calculate the node capability, as well as trust. Here, 
we have four agents: Node Agent (NA), Manager Agent (ManA), Ambassador Agent (AmA), 
and Inspector Agent (IA). 
The node agent that elected cluster head, it transforms itself to Manager Agent. This agent 
is responsible for all operations within the cluster and outside with counterparts. The manager 
agent maintains a table of confidence it contains the necessary information for the 
trustworthiness and authentication of each node in the cluster. The figure 5.12 illustrates the 
general architecture of our proposal (Contribution 3). 
 
AmAB sends a MS MoAB resends a MS 
Cal_Hash and it’s compared 
The Trust Level is ( ) 
Is the node D trust 
,?redirection st?
Search it CT Is the node D trust? 
The Trust Level is ( ) 
              AmAB sends TAB      towards AmAD with a MS 
The Trust Level is ( )  
And the Hash is ( ) 
AmAB MoAD MoAB AmAD 
Is the node B trust?  
And is there a MS from it? 
Sends  TAB with ACK OK 




Fig 5.13: Our Proposed Architecture for Security Model based Mobile Agent in 
MANETs (Contribution 3) 
In the following figure, which illustrates the internal architecture of the Manager Agent. A 
manager component act as a connector between the other components, the regulator and the 
crossing point obliged to call all of the component method. It also provides primitives change 
components. The manager agent creates the mobile agent like ambassador agent which sends 
it to all node in the cluster and the inspector agent that dispatch at specific intervals in order to 
sudden inspection process. The inspector agent after the return to manager agent carrying with 
it a report of the status of each node. In the case where there is an attack or an act suspicious, 
the manager agent launches a warning message to all nodes within and outside of the group. 
In parallel, it excites a maintenance operation, where it tries to kill the attack, exclusion of the 
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Figure 5.12: Architecture of Manager Agent 
5.4.1   Class Diagrams of Model (Contribution 3) 
Here we show the class diagram of this approach, which contains a Node Agent, an 













Figure 5.14: Class Diagrams of our Model (Contribution 3) 
The communication protocol is the same as the previous. In addition, if Manager Agent 
receive an alert message from a node, it creates (IA) and sends it urgently for detect the 
problem and return in order to take appropriate action. In the general case, a Manager Agents 
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5.5   Model Properties 
 Our model is dedicating to improving the security service in ad hoc networks and 
specifically for secure communication with Quality of Service, which is the main 
problem in this type of network. 
 Exploiting easy network, for this, we compose the network into a set of levels to get a 
hierarchical view, which will make the deployment of model taking into account the 
security service faster and easier. 
 The tasks allocated to the terminals in an unfair way according to the heterogeneous 
capacities, this implies an energy saving and take advantage of competence of a node. 
 We use the mobile agent technology that came from the field of artificial intelligence 
who gave significant benefits compared to other technologies and more suitable for 
wireless environments. For this, we associate with each terminal, an agent, which 
introduces a degree of intelligence in each node of the network. In addition, the use of 
the mobile agent technology overcomes the problems associated with the 
disconnection of nodes (Tolerance to Defects), and many more advantage. 
 Network terminals are heterogeneous. Therefore, we break down the security problem 
between the node, cluster, network, and cooperate among themselves to ensure strong 
security. 
 We have gain the benefits of both paradigms "agent" by the internal architecture and 
"component" that offer flexibility to our model, and therefore, it can give a good 
operation for the security function with quality of service. 
 In comparison of this model with others works described in the previous chapter. We 
note that each work deals almost one security goal, while this model treated more 
security goals. 
5.6   Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we presented the ''Security Model based Mobile Agent for Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks''. This model defines which types of security service can be provided in an ad hoc 
network and some mechanisms used to provide these services. Using cluster topology 
provides a hierarchical view of the network to best manage the security associated with each 
level. It takes into consideration more objective security. However, it is very difficult to 
guarantee certain goals of security because the constraints imposed by this type of network, in 
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particular: the mobility of the nodes, the dynamic and variable topology, and the 
heterogeneity of the terminals. 
The emphasis in this model is on the efficient management of resources in order to 
improve the security in a network where its topology can vary in a fast and random way. In 
addition, we have modeled the agent by a component assembly in order to facilitate its 
implementation, thus benefiting from the advantages of the component paradigm. 
Furthermore, we presented the class diagram of our model, the communication protocol 
between agents. Finally, we finished the chapter by the property of this model.                       .



















This chapter describes the implementation of our model, where we used a platform for 
developing mobile agents published by IBM called Aglets, accompanied with java 
development kit (JDK 7) and the NetBeans IDE version 8.0.2. These tools are installed on a 
computer running windows 7 system equipped by Intel core i7 processor. For testing the 
implementation, we used ad hoc network include four machines, such as every machine is 
configured to run the Aglet Agents. We examined at several scenarios of model, and discuss 
patterns (and associated implications) for how they could be increased the level of security in 
the ad hoc network, without effect it performance. Based on the obtained results, we can 
summarize that the implementation of our model satisfy the main objectives of the security.  
  
 
When I examine myself and my methods of thought, I come 
to the conclusion that the gift of fantasy has meant more to 
me than my talent for absorbing positive knowledge. 
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6.1   Introduction 
After detailing the concepts of our security model based mobile agent for ad hoc networks 
and discussing the internal architecture of the mobile agent, we describe in this chapter, its 
implementation has been performed using the agent platform Aglets under the JDK 7 and 
NetBeans IDE version 8.0.2 environment. 
Generally, the program of our model consists of four steps: the first is evaluates node 
resources such as the Trust Level, CPU load and memory, degree of the node, and an energy 
level. The second step will be the construction of the groups with the election (i.e. determine 
the cluster head and members. The third step is operation between agents in or out of the 
clusters.  The last step is the measurement of the efficiency to our model to function properly, 
control and detection the various attacks, and take appropriate solutions in case to detect any 
types of attacks. 
6.2   Implementation Tools 
6.2.1   Programming Language 
We chose to implement our model the Java language because Java is an object oriented 
programming language the high level, easy to use. It is a multi-platform language, which 
make it a choice of languages for programming a mobile code. It has some characteristics that 
led us to develop our system by using it, these features are: 
 Java overcomes the platforms: Opposite to many compilers, the Java translates source 
code into the language of a Java Virtual Machine (JVM). The Product code called 
bytecode is assigned to an interpreter, which reads and executes it. This is the key 
principle that enables to the mobile agent to adapt in all execution environments based 
in the implementation of task on an interpretive language such as Java [145]. In brief, 
Java works in interpreted mode as opposed to compiled languages, it is can run on 
multiple operating systems, offers the possibility to create simple application of multi 
tasks suitable for network, and on anywhere platform. 
 Java is multithreaded: The using an autonomous agent requires the use of a language 
for the competition and parallelism. This language must also include a synchronization 
management system. As we said in the second chapter an agent is a standalone 
program still waiting, and ready to respond to changes in its environment, therefore, 
the use of a multi-threaded language be required. 
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 Java is a strongly typed language, so very safe. It simultaneously offers a relative 
flexibility. In addition, Java provides us with multiple levels of data protection, as well 
as a mechanism for handling sophisticated exceptions. Moreover, it was developed in 
the interests of maximum security. The idea that a program containing errors should 
not be compiled. Thus, errors are unlikely to escape of the programmer. In fact, the 
Java program does not need to know all the classes at compile time. This possibility is 
very useful for dynamic loading of tasks contained in the library of the mobile agent. 
Furthermore, Java has a rich library that contains many security libraries among which 
we mention javax.security, javax.CryptoPackage or javax.crypto. 
6.2.2   Platform Aglets 
The criteria for choosing a mobile agent platform are naturally linked with the needs of the 
model proposed, and its characteristics. Thus, the platform must answer the following 
requirements: 
 The mobility of the Platform Aglets is flexible and robust. 
 The underlying programming language should provide adequate security enough 
features such as cryptographic functions and hash. 
 A free platform. 
Aglets is the nearest platform of our criteria, we used it to implement the architecture of 
the mobile agent. It is a platform of agents developed by Big Blue (IBM) in Java language.  
Environments are provided on hosts by specialized servers, which understand the aglet 
transfer protocol ATP and provide security and other services. The Aglet distribution is 
provided with such a server, called Tahiti. The design of aglets is modeled on that of Java 
applets. The word “Aglet” is a contraction of “Agent” and “Applet” [125]. Aglets renamed in 
1998 ASDK (Aglets Software Development Kit). The ASDK is intended to facilitate the 
creation of mobile agent. 
6.2.2.1   Architecture of Aglets 
The aglet object model defines a set of techniques to create mobile agents in an extended 
type of network. The main elements are [146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151]: 
 Aglet: Is a java-based autonomous software agent. Major buzzwords that can be used 
to characterize an Aglet are written in pure java, light-weight object migration, built 
with persistent support, event-driven. It visits local and remote hosts, and reacts to 
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events and messages. The Java aglet extends the model of network-mobile code made 
famous by Java applets. An aglet requires a host Java application, an aglet host, to be 
running on a computer before it can visit that computer. 
 Proxy: A proxy is a representative of an aglet. It serves as a shield for the aglet that 
protects the aglet from direct access to its public methods. The proxy also provides 












Figure 6.1: Relationship between Aglet and Proxy 
 
 Context: A context is an aglet's workplace; it is a stationary object provides a means 
for maintaining and managing active aglets in a uniform execution environment where 
the host system is secured against malicious aglets. 
 Host: A host is a machine capable of hosting multiple contexts. The host is generally a 
node in a network. 
 Message: A message is an object exchanged between aglets. It allows for synchronous 
as well as asynchronous message-passing between aglets. Message-passing can be 
used by aglets to collaborate and exchange information in a loosely coupled fashion. A 














Figure 6.2: Relationship between Host, Server Process, and Contexts 
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 Itinerary: An itinerary is an aglet's travel plan. It provides a convenient abstraction for 
non-trivial travel patterns and routing. 
 Identifier: An identifier is bound to each aglet. This identifier is globally unique and 
immutable throughout the lifetime of the aglet. 
6.2.2.2   Life-Cycle of Aglets  
The types of behavior of the Aglets have been implemented in a way to respond of the 
main needs of mobile agent.  The main operations affecting the life of Aglets are: 
 Creation: An aglet is created within a context. The new aglet is assigned an identifier, 
inserted into the context, and initialized. The aglet starts to execute as soon as it has 
been initialized. 
 Cloning: The cloning of an aglet produces an almost identical copy of the original 
aglet in the same context. The only differences are the assigned identifier and the fact 
that execution restarts in the new aglet. Note that execution threads are not cloned. 
 Dispatching: An aglet from one context to another will remove it from its current 
context and insert it into the destination context, where it will restart execution. We 
say that the aglet has been \pushed" into its new context. The retraction of an aglet will 
\pull" (remove) it from its current context and insert it into the context from which the 
retraction was requested. 
 Retraction: The retraction of an aglet will pull (remove) it from its current context and 














Figure 6.3: Life-Cycle of Aglets  
 Disposal: The destruction of an Aglet, will stop in its current execution and remove it 
from its current context. 
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 Activation/deactivation: The deactivation of an aglet is the ability to temporarily halt 
its execution and store its state in secondary storage. Activation of an aglet will restore 
it in a context. 
6.2.3   Programming Environment 
Integrated Development Environment (IDE) is a program combining a text editor, 
compiler, automatic creation tools, and often debugger. In Java, there are several IDE such as 
NetBeans (Sun), JCreator or Eclipse (IBM). The IDE that we will use must to be extensible, 
universal, versatile, free and compliant to the platform Aglets chosen. Our choice fell on 
NetBeans because it respond all criteria listed. 
NetBeans was created in Sun Microsystems initiative. It has all the characteristics 
necessary for a quality environment, whether to develop in Java, Ruby, C / C ++ or even PHP. 
NetBeans is under OpenSource license, it can develop and deploy quickly and free Swing 
GUI applications, Applets, JSP / Servlets, J2EE architectures in a highly customizable 
environment. NetBeans is a complete environment including all the features of development 
and all Java-related technologies for quick and visual development of Java applications [152]. 
6.3   Implementation and Tests 
In order to implement our Model we used a platform for developing mobile agents 
published by IBM called Aglets, accompanied with java development kit (JDK 7) and the 
NetBeans IDE version 8.0.2. For testing the prototype, we are using ad hoc network consisted 
of four node (laptop), where every node is configured to run the Aglet Agents. 
6.3.1   The First Scenario (Contribution 1) 
Note1: We assume the values of coefficient (a, b, c, d, e) as follows: a = 0.5, b = 0.3, c = 0.2, 
d = - 0.05, e = - 0.05. 
Note2: In the initial state, we gave the node that called maqbol and URL: atp://Node2:5002, 
the value =100 (Fully Trusted) of the trust level, while the other nodes takes the value = 59 
(Average) of the trust level. 
Note3: The degree of node = 60, i.e. the node has three neighbors, while the value = 40, i.e. 
the node has two neighbors. 
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     The following figure illustrated an example of initial state of the node, the Tahiti of the 










  Fig 6.4: Illustrated an Example of Initial State of the Node 
 
Fig 6.5: Explained the Election Process 
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The fig 6.5 at the top indicates the process of election between four ad hoc nodes where the 
node that called maqbol and URL: atp://Node2:5002 elected as Monitor Agent because it has 
the more capacity Cni that equal = 90.75%. While others nodes takes the Member states.      
After the election process, the Monitor agent creates the Inspector Agent as in fig 6.6, 
dispatch it to any node, which travels from one node to another for detect any attack or 




























Fig 6.9: Shows the Travels of Inspector Agent from Node4 to Node3 




Fig 6.10: Shows the Returns of Inspector Agent from Node3 to Node2 
     In our experimental results, shows the proposed Model is expected to perform better in all 
situations. For example, in the first test, we tested our Model that detect Black Hole Attack as 







      
 
In the second test, it is succeed to detect Denial of Service attack as in figure 14.  The 
Inspector Agent sends or delivers to the Monitor Agent an alert message contains the 
necessary information such as: Type of Attack, Source of attack, Node attacked, Date and 











Fig 6.12: Illustrates the Detection of Denial of Service Attack 
Fig 6.11: Illustrates the Detection of Black Hole Attack 
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6.3.2   The Second Scenario (Contribution 2) 
The hypothesis is same as the previous that we have seen in the first scenario. The node 
agent evaluates the resources of the node. After the election process to determine the monitor 
agent and the members, each monitor agent creates the Ambassador Agent (s) as in fig 6.13, 








Fig 6.13: Shows the Creation of Ambassador Agent 
The following figures 6.14, 6.15 illustrate respectively the reception of the ambassador 
agents, which are sent almost simultaneously by Monitor Agent, i.e. those nodes that have the 
URL(s): atp://Node4:5004 and atp://Node1:5002 receive ambassador agents that sent by node 













Fig 6.15: Shows Node1 Receives Ambassador Agent From Node2 
Chapter 6                                                            Experimentation and Performance Evaluation  
121 
  
In this scenario, and after several experiments, this model could to discover these 
















Fig 6.17: Illustrates the Detection of Wormhole Attack 
6.4   Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have specified development tools so justified their selection criteria in 
order to help developers for the implementation of our security Model. In order to prove the 
validity of the proposed Model, implementation and experimentation work has been 
conducted using the Aglet platform. The results show that our model raises the level of 
security in a Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, without affecting it performance; however, there are 
some issues, which may addressed in future works. 
 







Conclusion and Outlook 
 
I have offended God and mankind because my  
                                                                                              work didn’t reach the quality it should have 
   





Many security mechanisms have been proposed for wireless networks. Although these 
mechanisms could have responded a set of security requirements, they remain only effective 
in a specific context related to the assumptions and restrictive requirements that were issued  
during the design. The main subject of this thesis is to provide a solution to problems related 
to security in wireless networks and especially of the ad hoc networks. We tried to understand 
the behavior and the specifics of this kind of networking, as well as the various problems 
associated with security management in this environment. 
The mobile agent system is a very promising paradigm that has already established its 
presence in many applications including wireless networks. At the same time, this technology 
has introduced some security problems and emphasized some existing security issues. In this 
thesis, we surveyed the main issues in the security of mobile agents. We considered both the 
mobile agent and the agent platform points of view. We discussed the security threats and 
requirements that need to be met in order to alleviate those threats. 
We presented the most important techniques for providing security in mobile agent 
systems. Some of those techniques, for example Sandboxing, Code Signing, safe Code 
Interpretation, State Appraisal, etc. Furthermore, we presented the security techniques of the 
mobile agent against the attacks that are launched by malicious platforms. Some of those 
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techniques, for example Execution Tracing, Co-Operating Agents, Obfuscated Code, Partial 
Result Encapsulation, etc. None of the existing techniques provides an optimal solution for all 
scenarios. In any case, more research is needed in the future to warrant sufficient trust in 
mobile agent technology by a wide range of users. 
In this thesis, we present our novel and effective model that we have devised and titled 
“Security Model based on Mobile Agent for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks” that aims to improve 
the level of security. This model used on a network topology based on the concept of clusters 
and mobile agent technology. i.e. the network organization at three levels (node level, cluster 
level, and network level) for hierarchical management of the security services. We are used an 
optimization function of five parameters to evaluate node resources and the formula to 
estimate the trust ability of the node.  
In the first contribution, we define three agent types. The Node Agent (NA) manages the 
use of node resources. The Monitor Agent created in the most trusted with best resources 
node to control the communication inside and outside the cluster. The Monitor Agent (MoA) 
creates the Inspector Agent (IA), which travails from node to another to examine the actions 
history of each node agent to detect any suspect behavior, and returns to MoA with report 
shows the status of each node in the cluster.  
In the second contribution, we proposed four types of agents. Node Agent (NA), Monitor 
Agent (MoA), Ambassador Agent (AmA), and Transporter Agent (TA). The Monitor Agent 
creates the Ambassador Agents and sending to all nodes in the cluster. The Ambassador 
Agent is like local IDS and IPS (Intrusion Detection System and Intrusion Prevention System) 
at the node.   
The third contribution is considered a hybrid approach for the two preceding. We gave the 
architecture interne of mobile agent, class diagrams, and communication protocol for our 
model.  
To implement the proposed model, we choose to use the Aglet platform, because it is 
appropriate for developing mobile agent. Based on the obtained results, we can summarise 
that the implementation of our Model satisfy the main objectives of the security. 
 Authentication: Where we used the Monitor Agent after the election process as 
trusted site. 
 Confidentiality: We used the mechanism of cryptography symmetric inside the 
cluster and asymmetric outside the cluster. 
 Availability: The Monitor Agent checks the presence of Nodes by it sends a message 
or by Inspector Agent. 
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 Integrity: To realize the integrity we use the hash value for verifying the data sent 
through the nodes of network. In our model, we used Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-
1). 
 Non-repudiation: The repudiation cannot appears in our model because Node 
Agent(s) or/and Ambassador Agent(s) records all sends and receives operations. In 
addition, the Inspector Agent has the ability to detect any repudiation through analysis 
and comparison. 
However, the solution we propose and realize is certainly not the magic solution to the 
security problem in ad hoc networks, we can not cover all the points of our theme but we hope 
to have succeeded in opening ports to studies in future to develop or make improvements to 
this solution. It is clear that there are improvements that remain in order to achieve a more 
acceptable level of security. 
 The evaluation of any security parameters is one of the perspectives of our work and it 
would be interesting to carry out this study under true real conditions. There are a 
number of parameters, which we would like to explore, for example, response time, 
error rate, detection rate, etc. 
 We have tried to find a general framework that can be adapted to different types of 
network and application, i.e. although these approaches have been able to respond to a 
set of security requirements, they remain effective only in a specific context related to 
the assumptions and restrictive requirements that were issued during the design. 
 We have made a comparison study between this model and other work to prove the 
effectiveness of this model or not. Thus, each approach (contribution) needs to be 
improved as an independent approach. 
 Finally, we addressed some attack especially the attack of masquerade, which appears 
if an agent pretend to be a very trustful entity for wining a main position in the 
network with evil intent.                                                      .                                                                                                              
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